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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the sweeping Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress di-
rected the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to adopt regulations
"to assure the commercial availability ... of converter boxes, interactive com-
munications equipment, and other equipment used by consumers to access
multichannel video programming ... from manufacturers, retailers, and other
vendors . . . ."' Yet, despite considerable effort and at least one billion dollars
spent to implement the agency's "CableCard" regime,2 the FCC repeatedly
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I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 304, 110 Stat. 56, 125-126
(1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2006)).
2 See discussion infra Part III.A; see, e.g., In re Video Device Competition; Implemen-
tation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Commercial Availability of
Navigation Devices; Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics
Equipment, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 4275, 4301 (Apr. 21, 2010) (statement of
Comm'r Baker) ("As we consider a long-term solution, I hope that we recall valuable les-
sons from the CableCARD regime. First, our technological mandates come with significant
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concedes that its "efforts [to implement Section 629] to date have not led to a
robustly competitive retail market for navigation devices that connect to sub-
scription video services."3 Indeed, only about one percent of navigation devices
are purchased at retail.4 This profound lack of interest in such devices, which
are available at big-box electronic stores, is a significant indictment of the
agency's implementation of Section 629. If the acquisition of set-top boxes in
a commercial market had even moderate consumer interest, then it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the share of the market for such devices would be high-
er than one percent.5
Frustrated by its billion-dollar policy dud, the FCC has recently expressed a
renewed interest in Section 629.6 In its National Broadband Plan,7 and then in
costs. By one estimate, the cost of CableCARD compliance for the cable industry alone -
costs passed on to cable consumers - has totaled nearly one billion dollars. Second, we
should be careful not to mandate particular technological solutions that would freeze into
place the current state of technology.") [hereinafter All Vid NO1] (citation omitted).
3 Id. 10; see also In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices; Compatibility Between Cable
Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment; Oceanic Time Warner Cable, a subsidiary
of Time Warner Cable, Inc.; Oceanic Time Warner Cable, a division of Time Warner Cable,
Inc., Oceanic Kauai Cable System; Oceanic Time Warner Cable, a division of Time Warner
Cable, Inc., Oceanic Oahu Central Cable System; Cox Communications Inc., Fairfax Coun-
ty, Virginia Cable System; Cable One, Inc.'s Request for Waiver of Section 76.1204(a)(1)
of the Commission's Rules, Third Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 25
F.C.C.R. 14,657, 4 (Oct. 14, 2010) ("Unfortunately, the Commission's efforts to date have
not developed a vigorous competitive market for retail navigation devices that connect to
subscription video services.") [hereinafter Commercial Availability III]; FCC, CONNECTING
AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 50 (2010), available at
http://commcns.org/sCCj9m. ("Despite Congressional and FCC intentions, CableCARDs
have failed to stimulate a competitive retail market for set-top boxes.") [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL BROADBAND PLAN].
4 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, 4.
5 Even when consumers have the option to buy rather than lease equipment (e.g., the
cable broadband modem), the demand is low. See, e.g., Comment Sought on Video Device
Innovation, NBP Public Notice #27, Letter from National Cable & Telecomm. Ass 'n, GN
Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, CS Docket No. 97-80 (Dec. 4, 2009) (accessible via
FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) [hereinafter NBP Public Notice].
6 Indeed, in the National Broadband Plan, the Commission expressed its exasperation
about the failed CableCARD experiment, lamenting that a "national or global market with
relatively low costs of entry, like that for many consumer electronics markets, should sup-
port more than two competitors [i.e., manufacturers of set-top boxes] over time." NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 50. According to the Commission, this is because
"[r]etail set-top boxes have been competing on an uneven playing field[]" that has "prompt-
ed some companies not to enter the market at all." Id. at 51, 67 n. 115 (citing a news article
reporting on Steve Jobs' reluctance to produce Apple TV as a set-top box with access to
traditional TV content through MVPDs).
7 Id. at 36. ("The FCC should initiate a proceeding to ensure that all multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs) install a gateway device or equivalent functionality in
all new subscriber homes and in all homes requiring replacement set-top boxes, starting on
or before Dec. 31, 2012.").
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a subsequent Notice ofInquiry, the FCC contemplates a "do-over" for Section
629, hoping that another hard-line regulatory approach will succeed where the
CableCard paradigm has failed. The Commission's new all video ("AllVid")
proposal envisions a regulation whereby the FCC would require multi-channel
video programming distributors ("MVPDs") "to provide a small, low-cost
adapter that would connect to proprietary MVPD networks and would provide
a common interface for connection to televisions, DVRs, and other smart video
devices . . . ."9 According to the Commission, while this adapter "would per-
form the conditional access functions as well as tuning, reception, and up-
stream communication as directed by the smart video device""° (e.g., an "All-
Vid Compatible" DVR, television, or home theater personal computer"), the
"adapter and the smart video device would communicate with each other using
a standard interface, but each adapter would be system-specific to a particular
MVPD in order to communicate with its network."' 2
The AllVid approach should sound familiar. Conceptually, the scheme
closely follows the CableCard idea in that AllVid is simply a proposal to sepa-
rate conditional access from other features of the set-top box in the hopes of
creating a retail market for the latter. There are, however, a few notable differ-
ences between AllVid and the CableCard. First, the FCC seeks to expand reg-
ulation coverage to include direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") providers, which
are presently excluded from the CableCard regulatory mandates. '" Conse-
quently, the scope of the AllVid regulation is much more expansive and, there-
fore, will likely be more difficult to design, implement, and administer given
the business models of the affected parties and the profound differences in
their delivery technologies. 4 Moreover, by applying Section 629 to the DBS
8 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 10 ("Although following adoption of the CableCARD
rules some television manufacturers sold unidirectional digital cable-ready products ('UD-
CPs'), most manufactures have abandoned the technology.").
9 Id. 16.
1o Id.
"1 Id. at app. AllVid Concept Illustrations, 4293.
12 Id. 16.
13 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14,775, 64-65
(June 11, 1998) ("[W]e do not think that requiring DBS ["direct broadcast satellite"] service
providers to separate security elements will serve the goal of enhanced competition in either
the service or equipment markets.") [hereinafter Commercial Availability 1]
14 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 12 ("[M]ost consumer electronics manufacturers ac-
knowledge that an attempt to establish standards for navigation devices that would work
with each of the different delivery technologies without some intermediation would be im-
practical and prohibitively expensive."). Recently, the FCC used its Section 629 authority to
expressly regulate both the price of equipment and video service. Commercial Availability
III, supra note 3, 19 ("Accordingly, we also adopt a rule that requires cable operators to
reduce the price of packages that include set-top box rentals by the cost of a set-top box
rental for customers who use retail devices, and prohibits cable operators from assessing
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industry, the FCC would effectively impose new price regulation of equipment
on satellite providers, thus widening the scope of price regulation in the com-
munications industry. 5 Finally, the Commission seeks not merely to make set-
top boxes for MVPDs commercially available as mandated by the statute, but
intends for AllVid-compatible devices to accommodate the services of non-
MVPD sources, such as over-the-top video services.'6
As is too often the case with bold Commission policy initiatives, the agen-
cy's aggressive attempt to implement Section 629 has proceeded entirely with-
out any formal economic analysis of the nature of the service-equipment rela-
tionship in the MVPD market. In this paper, we attempt to remedy that short-
coming. Our findings are potentially significant in several respects.
First, in contrast to the common view that the self-supply model of set-top
boxes is anticompetitive and anti-consumer, our theoretical analysis reveals
that the set-top box conveys no market power to the MVPD, even if we assume
that the provider of multichannel video services is a monopoly. Set-top boxes
are necessary appendages (i.e., complements) to subscription video services
and, as such, the provider can obtain all profits from the service itself.7
Second, our analysis indicates that the MVPD has no anticompetitive pref-
erence for self-supply. If the equipment can be produced more efficiently and
sold at a lower price in a competitive retail market, then the provider will em-
brace such a market to the benefit of both provider and consumer. However, if
the equipment can be sold at a lower price through self-supply, then the pro-
viders will prefer that option, which will also benefit both provider and con-
sumer.
service fees on consumer-owned devices that are not imposed on leased devices. These price
reductions must reflect the portion of the package price that is reasonably allocable to the
device lease fee.").
15 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 304, 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2006) ("[R]egulations
shall not prohibit any [MVPD] from also offering converter boxes.., to consumers, if the
system operator's charges to consumers for such devices and equipment are separately stat-
ed and not subsidized by charges for any such service."). Thus, under Section 629, firms do
not have complete freedom to set prices for set-top equipment. Id.
16 AliVid NOI, supra note 2, 17 ("This approach would provide the necessary flexibil-
ity for consumer electronics manufacturers to develop new technologies, including combin-
ing MVPD content with over-the-top video services (such as videos offered from, for exam-
ple, Amazon, Hulu, iTunes, or NetFlix), manipulating the channel guide, providing more
advanced parental controls, providing new user interfaces, and integrating with mobile de-
vices.").
17 See, e.g., In re Video Device Competition: Implementation of Section 304 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996; Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices; Com-
patibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Reply Comments
of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, MB Docket No. 10-91, CS
Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, at 2 (Aug. 12, 2010) (available via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System) ("[S]et-top boxes are an enabler of our core service, which is vid-
eo, not equipment.").
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Third, this paper demonstrates that a government-directed commercial mar-
ket for set-top boxes is unlikely to provide substantial gains in terms of lower
costs, lower prices, or increased innovation. If the set-top box can be manufac-
tured at a lower cost and sold at a lower price, then the MVPD will embrace
the cost reduction, profits will rise, and consumers will benefit. Also, if inno-
vation increases the value of set-top boxes to consumers, the MVPD is incen-
tivized to implement that innovation. As a result, profits will be higher and
consumers will be better off. Because the incentives to reduce prices and in-
crease innovation remain intact, the prospects for a forced commercial market
are slim. That is, where a commercial market produces lower costs and spurs
innovation, the FCC will not need to mandate such a market because industry
would welcome it.
When placed within an economic framework, the FCC's heavy-handed ap-
proach to Section 629 is largely misguided. It may truthfully be characterized
as "[t]he burnt Fool's bandaged finger go[ing] wabbling back to the fire."'8
History has shown that MVPDs prefer an efficient outcome, and since markets
detest inefficiency, a heavy-handed regulatory approach to Section 629 is
doomed to fail. Therefore, our simple economic analysis of set-top boxes-the
first of its kind on this issue-encourages the FCC to substantially reorient its
thinking on Section 629. The economics of the service-equipment relationship
in multichannel video prescribes a light-touch approach for set-top boxes, one
much different from the agency's oppressive AllVid (and CableCard) proposal.
So what is the FCC to do? If the existing market mechanism of self-supply
for set-top boxes is, in fact, inefficient, then it is doubtful that either the Com-
mission's recent modifications to the CableCard regime 9 or its new AIlVid
proposal will produce a different result than that observed thus far.2" Competi-
tion is evolving in video delivery without the technology-specific mandates of
Section 629, and an efficient commercial market for set-top boxes will emerge
without similar regulatory interference. An inefficient commercial market will
not evolve naturally, but government action could create and sustain it. For the
Commission's efforts to implement Section 629 to succeed, not only must pol-
icy change, but the fundamental economics of the service-equipment relation-
ship in the multichannel video market must also change. This Article argues
that, until the underlying economic reality changes, perhaps due to some tech-
nological innovation, the FCC's anticipated aggressive approach to Section.
629 will likely keep the agency in "the Valley of Unattained Goals."'" Given
18 Rudyard Kipling, The Gods of Copybook Maxims, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Jan.
1920, at 146.
19 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, 13.
20 See, e.g., AllVidNO!, supra note 2, at 4301 (statement of Comm'r Baker).




these economic realities, perhaps it is time for the Commission to develop a
way to satisfy the requirements necessary to invoke the sunset provision of
Section 629.22
This Article proceeds in Part II with a brief summary of Section 629. Part III
outlines the Commission's prior attempts to implement Section 629, discussing
both the CableCard paradigm and the newly proposed AlIVid regime. Part III
then examines the arguments as to why the CableCard experiment failed, and
why the agency believes a new AllVid regime is required. Next, Parts IV and
V present an economic analysis of the problem and explain why past ap-
proaches to implement Section 629 were doomed to fail. In turn, Part VI sets
forth fact-based legal and economic arguments to satisfy the sunset require-
ments of Section 629, should the Commission elect to go down that path. Fi-
nally, Section VII outlines conclusions and policy recommendations.
II. SECTION 629 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
Section 629 was added to the Communications Act by way of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996.23 Congress, seeing that it was possible to have retail
competition for telephone customer premises equipment, enacted Section 629
with similar aspirations for set-top boxes.24 Specifically, Section 629 instructs
the FCC to:
[A]dopt regulations to assure the commercial availability, to consumers of... equip-
ment used . . . to access multichannel video programming and other services offered
over multichannel video programming systems, from manufacturers, retailers, and
other vendors not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distributor.25
A plain reading of the statute implies that consumers should be able to pur-
chase this equipment from sources other than the service provider.26 Generally,
MVPDs are not vertically integrated with manufacturers of set-top boxes, but
they can purchase boxes from companies such as Motorola, Cisco, Samsung,
Panasonic, and Pace.27 Nonetheless, these boxes are typically designed to han-
dle the particular needs of individual MVPDs and, consequently, cannot be
shuttled across different MVPD platforms.
22 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
23 47 U.S.C. § 549.
24 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, I I ("The competitive market for con-
sumer equipment in the telephone context provides the model of a market we have sought to
emulate in this proceeding."). See also AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 4.
25 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
26 CommercialAvailability I, supra note 13, 1.
27 Id. 99; Ralitza A. Grigorova-Minchev & Thomas W. Hazlett, Policy-Induced Com-
petition: The Case of Cable TV Set-Top Boxes, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 279, 297-98
(2011).
28 AllVidNOI, supra note 2, 15.
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Other restrictions in the statute are also helpful in determining Congress' in-
tent with respect to the implementation of Section 629. First, in adopting such
regulations, the FCC shall "consult[] with appropriate industry standard-setting
organizations."29 Second, the FCC cannot prohibit MVPDs from also offering
equipment to their subscribers "if the system operator's charges to consumers
for such devices and equipment are separately stated and not subsidized by
charges for" multichannel video programming and other services.3 Thus, by
statute, MVPDs may be active participants in a retail set-top box market,
though the prices charged for such equipment are subject to some regulatory
limitations.3 The language of the Act suggests a minimum, cost-based price
requirement. This interpretation will be addressed in further detail below.
The statute also authorizes the FCC to grant waivers under certain condi-
tions,32 while providing some other limitations.33 Sunset provisions permit the
FCC to set aside entirely the equipment mandates if the following three condi-
tions are met: (1) the MVPD market is "fully competitive;" (2) there is a "fully
competitive" market for "converter boxes[] and interactive communications
equipment;" and (3) the absence of the regulation will serve the public interest
and encourage competition.34 In the past, the agency has granted numerous
Section 629 waivers35 and found justification in the marketplace to exclude
DBS distributors from its implementation mandates.36
III. IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS TO DATE
As the history of how the FCC initially sought to implement Section 629 is
tortured and complex, this Part will provide only a brief history. Notably, the
29 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
30 Id.
31 Equipment may also be subject to regulation pursuant to Section 623 of the Act. See
47 U.S.C. § 543.
32 47 U.S.C. § 549(c).
33 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 549(d)(1).
34 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
35 See, e.g., In re Cablevision Systems Corporation's Request For Waiver of Section
76.1204(a)(1) of the Commission's Rules; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996; Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 220, 22-23 (Jan. 10, 2007) [hereinafter January Waiver
Requests]; In re Consolidated Requests For Waiver of Section 76.1204(a)(1) of the Com-
mission's Rules; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996;
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22
F.C.C.R. 11780, 63 (June 29, 2007) [hereinafter June Waiver Requests]; In re Guam Ca-
blevision, LLC; Request for Waiver of Section 76.1204(a)(1) of the Commission's Rules;
Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Commercial Avail-
ability of Navigation Devices, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 11747, 1117
(June 29, 2007) [hereinafter Guam Cablevision Memorandum].
36 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 64.
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agency's CableCARD proposal has withstood numerous statutory challenges."
A. The Failed CableCARD Experiment
When the FCC first sought to implement Section 629, it had to reconcile the
statutory goals of assuring the "commercial availability" of navigation devices
with that of avoiding any major risks to content security. 8 The FCC reasoned
that if it could somehow split a typical set-top box into two separate compo-
nents-i.e., the operational and functional components on one hand and the
access control features on the other-it would be possible to have the first part
available through retail outlets and the second part, containing the more sensi-
tive access control apparatus, available only from the service provider (i.e., the
cable operator). 9 The FCC, noting the danger of "'detailed government stan-
dard setting,' left it to the cable industry and its national standard-setting or-
ganizations to develop the appropriate interfaces."4 This interface eventually
became the "CableCARD," which is a security device that, when inserted into
either the television or set-top box, allows the consumer to view otherwise en-
crypted video.4
But the FCC went one step beyond simply instructing the industry to de-
velop the CableCARD when it imposed an "integration ban," which required
cable operators to cease the integration of the security function into set-top
boxes leased to consumers. 2 This ban effectively required the cable operators
to use the CableCARD in all of their leased equipment. 3 While the cable in-
37 See generally Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding
that the FCC's denial of a waiver was not inconsistent with earlier waivers because "the
allegedly inconsistent [earlier] waivers were all granted by the FCC's Media Bureau and
were not appealed to the Commission."); Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 45
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting the cable industry's various challenges to the FCC's decision to
retain the integration ban); Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724, 730 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (overcoming the National Cable Television Association's ("NCTA") argument that
the integration ban is "squarely foreclosed" by the language of Section 629).
38 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R.
5639, 1 (Feb. 11, 1997) [hereinafter CommercialAvailability NPRMI; 47 U.S.C. § 549(a)-
(b) ("The [FCC] shall not prescribe regulations... which would jeopardize security of mul-
tichannel video programming and other services."); see also Gen. Instrument Corp., 213
F.3d at 728-29 (discussing the Congressional mandate directing the FCC to balance com-
mercial availability with security).
39 Commercial Availability NPRM, supra note 38, 34.
40 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 75; see also Gen. Instrument Corp., 213
F.3d at 728.
41 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 7; see also Gen. Instrument Corp., 213 F.3d at 728 (dis-
cussing the history leading up to the establishment of the CableCARD).
42 AlIVid NOI, supra note 2, 7; Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 69.
43 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 7.
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dustry fought the integration ban on multiple grounds in court, the FCC pre-
vailed each time."
Although space constraints prevent a detailed exegesis of every legal argu-
ment raised in these cases, of particular interest (and germane to the analysis
presented here) is the FCC's economic rationale supporting the integration ban.
Specifically, the Commission argued that, although the integration ban may
impose short-term costs (i.e., higher prices for non-integrated set-top boxes),
long-term benefits "likely to flow from a more competitive and open supply
market" would outweigh them.4" Such benefits include the "'potential savings
to consumers from greater choice among navigation devices' ... the spurring
of technological innovations," and the equally amorphous argument that "Con-
gress regarded the commercial availability of navigation devices from inde-
pendent sources as a benefit in and of itself."'46 Rather than test the veracity of
the FCC's cost-benefit analysis, however, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly de-
ferred to the agency's expertise."
Yet, by the FCC's own admission, the hard truth is that the CableCARD ex-
periment achieved neither the Commission's original goal of developing a
"competitive market for retail navigation devices," nor Congress' intent of
Section 629." According to the FCC, most cable subscribers continue to use
44 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("we reject Comcast's
argument that the Commission's denial of its waiver request was discriminatory or inconsis-
tent with prior FCC policies."); Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 41 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding that the Commission reasonably concluded that "[i]f cable operators 'must
take steps to support their own compliant equipment, it seems far more likely that they will
continue to support and take into account the need to support services that will work with
independently supplied and purchased equipment.") (citation omitted); Gen. Instrument
Corp., 213 F.3d at 730 (accepting as reasonable the Commission's construction of the term
"converter boxes" as not including "integrated converter boxes," thereby rejecting NCTA's
argument that the statute precluded the integration).
45 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Second Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R., 29
(Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Commercial Availability I1].
46 Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 460 F.3d at 42 (citations omitted) (quoting Commercial
Availability I1, supra note 45, 29).
47 See, e.g., Comcast Corp., 526 F.3d at 767; Charter Commc 'ns, Inc., 460 F.3d at 42.
Comcast's argument in support of a waiver under [S]ection 629(c) primarily turns on cost
concerns-the company argues that if non-integrated digital [converter] boxes become more
expensive, then fewer customers will migrate to digital cable. But from the start, the FCC
has conceded that the integration ban may impose short-term costs on cable companies and
consumers. It reasoned, however, that those costs "should be counterbalanced to a signifi-
cant extent by the benefits likely to flow from a more competitive and open supply market,"
such as lower prices, more choices, and the spurring of technological innovation. We af-
firmed that determination ... and we may not revisit that conclusion here even if we wished
to--which we do not.
Comcast Corp., 526 F.3d at 767 (citations omitted).




the traditional set-top boxes leased from their cable operator; only one percent
of the total navigation devices that are deployed are purchased at retail.49 Thus,
as the FCC concedes, this "evidence indicates that many retail device manufac-
turers abandoned CableCARD before any substantial benefits of the integration
ban could be realized."5 In other words, the FCC's predicted gains in terms of
prices and innovation from the CableCARD regime never arrived. In addition
to the unrealized gains, FCC Commissioner Meredith Baker recognized that
the costs of CableCARD compliance are estimated to be one billion dollars.5"
The cost-benefit outcome of the CableCARD is decidedly, and admittedly,
unfavorable.
B. So Why Did CableCARD Fail? The Commission's Responses
As noted above, most observers - including the FCC - consider the Ca-
bleCARD regime to be a failure. Undeterred, however, the Commission not
only recently made tweaks to its existing CableCARD regime,52 but it also
wants to move on to a successor regime, "AllVid."53 In the following three sec-
tions, we explore the F.CC's explanations for why CableCARD failed and,
equally as important, what steps the agency believes will be necessary to rem-
edy the problem. In Section IV, we provide an economic explanation for the
failure of CableCARD.
1. The Third Report
Concurrent with its introduction of the proposed AllVid approach, the
Commission recently sought to modify its failed CableCARD regime.54 While
the Commission stated that it was "sympathetic" to concerns that it was seek-
ing another bite at the CableCARD apple, while simultaneously proposing the
AllVid regime, the agency believed it necessary to proceed on both tracks be-
cause "CableCARD is a realized technology" and "consumer electronics man-
ufacturers can build to and are building to the standard today."55 To this end,
the Commission instituted five reforms to the CableCARD regime that, it
hoped, would get the process back on track and produce a competitive retail
49 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, 4.
50 Id. 4; see also AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 10 (referring to the CableCARD, the
FCC declared, "most manufactures [sic] have abandoned the technology").
51 AIlVidNOI, supra note 2, at 4301-02 (Baker, Comm'r, concurring).
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market as contemplated by Section 629.56
The first step the Commission took was to require cable operators to provide
retail devices with access to switched-digital channels (although it did so with-
out specifying the technology that cable operators must use to ensure such
compatibility).5 In the Commission's view, subscribers "must be able to use
the devices they purchase at retail to access all of the linear channels that com-
prise the cable package they purchase."58 Thus, reasoned the Commission,
"[p]roviding retail navigation devices and leased navigation devices with
equivalent access to linear programming at an equivalent service price is essen-
tial to a retail market for navigation devices."59
Next, the Commission adopted a requirement that "cable operators promi-
nently list the fee for their CableCARDs as a line item on their websites (read-
ily accessible to all members of the public) and annual rate cards separate from
their host devices, and provide such information orally or in writing at a sub-
scriber's request."'  Moreover, the Commission ordered that these Cable-
CARD lease fees be uniform across a cable system regardless of whether the
CableCARD is used in a leased set-top box or a navigation device purchased at
retail.6 Finally, the Commission was "not convinced" that "cable operators
[we]re not subsidizing the costs of leased set-top boxes with service fees." 2 As
a result, the Commission adopted a rule requiring cable operators to reduce the
prices of packages that include set-top box rentals by the cost of a set-top box
rental for customers who use retail devices, and prohibiting cable operators
from assessing service fees on consumer-owned devices that are not imposed
on leased devices.6 According to the Commission, these price reductions must
reflect the portion of the package price that is "reasonably allocable" to the
device lease fee.'
Third, the Commission ruled that "the best means of assuring the develop-
ment of a retail market for navigation devices is to require cable operators to
allow subscribers to self-install CableCARDs."'65 In addition, the Commission
made it easier for consumers to file complaints with the Commission, citing
examples in the record where consumers had to schedule multiple appoint-













party retail outlet.' In the Commission's view, the "need to schedule multiple
installation appointments unquestionably is an impediment to realizing a com-
petitive retail market for navigation devices" and, as such, believed that "Con-
gress's intent in adopting Section 629 was to ensure that cable operators treat
retail navigation devices in the same manner that they treat leased navigation
devices. '"67
Fourth, the Commission mandated that cable operators provide multi-stream
CableCARD by default, unless a subscriber expressly requests a single-stream
CableCARD.68 In the Commission's view, such a requirement will ensure the
development of a retail market for navigation devices in that such a mandate
"will conform more closely with the concept of common reliance, provide im-
proved customer experience, and impose little, if any, costs on the industry. 69
Fifth, the Commission took steps to update and streamline CableCARD de-
vice certification. In particular, the Commission both modified its rules to re-
flect updated testing procedures and formally prohibited "CableLabs or other
qualified testing facilities from refusing to certify [Unidirectional Digital Cable
Products] for any reason other than a failure to comply with the conformance
checklists referenced"7 under current rules. However, the Commission ob-
served that these rule changes did little more than codify the certification proc-
ess as it exists today.7'
Notably, all the FCC's actions appear to view the CableCARD's failure as a
result of limitations in its operational parameters. Never has the agency con-
sidered that its proposals are being impeded by the underlying economics of
the equipment-service relationship in multichannel video markets. This omis-
sion is important. If CableCARD's defects lie in its inherent inefficiency rela-
tive to self-supply, then solving the problems outlined by the FCC will not
produce a successful alternative to the CableCARD of the past. The theoretical
analysis, infra, indicates that even if the commercially- and self-supplied set-
top boxes are identical, the commercial model may be relatively inefficient,
imposing significant implementation costs without any offsetting benefits.
Moreover, if changes to the CableCARD regime, or adoption of the proposed
AllVid approach, cannot resolve the operational defects identified, then failure
of AllVid is near certain as the regulatory approach is burdened with both inef-
ficiency and operational shortfalls. In fact, with rapidly evolving technology, it
66 Id. 28.
67 Id. 29.
68 Id. 33. A multi-stream cable card permits multiple channels to be decoded, permit-






Wobbling Back to the Fire
is possible that the principle defect in CableCARD and AllVid is the mere act
of defining the device, in that by defining the device the FCC locks in a tech-
nological standard that will soon be outdated.
2. The AllVid NOI
In the FCC's AllVid NOI, the agency takes a slightly different approach to
explain why CableCARD failed and why the AllVid approach is required. Ac-
cording to the Commission, the "limited interest in purchasing retail devices
that can access MVPD services" is attributable to "two fundamental defects.
72
First, the Commission believes that "with few exceptions retail navigation de-
vices are unable to provide functionality beyond that available in devices that
subscribers can lease from their providers and often are unable to access many
of the MVPD services that leased set-top devices are able to access."" Second,
the Commission believes that "as a general matter a retail navigation device
purchased for use with one MVPD's services cannot be used with the services
of a competing MVPD."74 Again, both explanations for the CableCARD's fail-
ure are operational characteristics of the device. Notably, the FCC provides no
explanation as to why its AllVid mandate will successfully resolve these opera-
tional defects or, more importantly, how AllVid is more future-proof than the
CableCARD. Moreover, the FCC has yet to consider the possibility that the
failure of the CableCARD may be the consequence of powerful and legitimate
economic forces working against its success.
To remedy these alleged defects, the FCC chose to dig in rather than recon-
sider; that is, the agency proposes merely to amplify the CableCARD to rem-
edy its operational shortcomings. This leads the agency to the AllVid ap-
proach, which seeks to:
[P]lace the network-specific functions such as conditional access, provisioning, recep-
tion, and decoding of the signal in one small, inexpensive operator-provided adapter,
which could be either (i) a set-back device-which today could be as small as a deck
of cards-that attaches to the back of a consumer's television set or set-top box, or (ii)
a home gateway device that routes MVPD content throughout a subscriber's home
network. The adapter would act as a conduit to connect proprietary MVPD networks
with navigation devices, TV sets, and a broad range of other equipment in the home.
The AllVid adapter would communicate over open standards widely used in home
communications protocols, as outlined below, enabling consumers to select and access
content through navigation devices of their choosing purchased in a competitive retail
market. MVPDs would, of course, be free to participate in the retail market by offer-
ing navigation devices for sale or lease to consumers, but those devices would be sep-
arate from the adapter and marketed separately."






The AlIVid adapter is conceptually identical to the CableCARD in that its
primary purpose is to separate conditional access from the other functions of
the set-top box. As such, the FCC's general approach to Section 629 is largely
unchanged by AllVid. Unfortunately, although the FCC again promises that
AllVid will be different and that a vibrant and innovative retail market is just
around the corner,76 there is no compelling evidence that AllVid will succeed
where the CableCARD has failed. As we show infra, the economic factors that
killed the CableCARD are likewise working against the FCC's aggressive
AllVid approach, so that AllVid is likely to follow the same path to costly fail-
ure. With rapidly evolving technology, success is unlikely for any regulation
that, by its very nature, locks in a particular technology. Of this, the Cable-
CARD is an archetype.
3. Other Explanations for CableCARD's Failure
Notwithstanding the preceding two sections, the Commission has in various
other forums also set forth one other explanation for the failure to realize the
goals of Section 629: MVPD foot-dragging. For example in the AllVid NOI,
the Commission specifically stated that it wants to create a regime wherein
device manufacturers are encouraged "to develop and introduce innovative
smart video devices without being deterred by the need to consult with
MVPDs."" FCC Commissioner Michael Copps echoed a similar sentiment in
his statement to the AllVid NOI, arguing:
The path to the retail market has been, for many reasons, obstructed at nearly every
turn. Something is clearly not working as intended when consumers encounter such
disparities between the cost, installation and support of CableCARD devices for those
who purchase a retail device and for those leasing the cable provider's set-top box.78
And Commissioner Mignon Clyburn apparently holds a similar view, not-
ing:
The time has undoubtedly arrived for us to examine the potential for any electronics
manufacturer to offer smart video devices at retail that can be used with the services
of any MVPD. In addition, given that the current process for obtaining MVPD certifi-
cation is so cumbersome and expensive, I am eager to explore ways in which such
manufacturers can forego unnecessary coordination and negotiation with M4VPDs.7 9
The sentiment that the cable industry intentionally sabotaged CableCard is
76 Id. The Commission specifically states that the new AllVid model will, inter alia,
"spur the development of a competitive retail market in navigation devices, thus providing
subscribers with viable alternatives to leasing or buying a set-top box from their MVPD"
and "drive down retail prices for devices used to access MVPD services without increasing
the prices of those services." Id. 23.
77 Id. 23 (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 4296 (statement of Comm'r Copps).
79 Id. at 4300 (statement of Comm'r Clybum).
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widely held. For example, the left-leaning political interest group Free Press
claims that the "cable industry played a prominent role in impeding the poten-
tial success of CableCard, a fact often brought to the Commission's atten-
tion.""0 Similarly, Professor Marvin Ammori, former General Counsel of the
Free Press, argues that CableCard failed because MVPDs "generate huge fees
from renting these boxes because they dominate the market for them and have
made it difficult for consumers to purchase boxes from any independent com-
pany.""' Likewise, Public Knowledge argues that the failure of CableCard was
not "technical or economic, but behavioral" because "MVPDs have consis-
tently attempted to keep 'foreign devices' from their networks." 2 And, not to
be left out, Pennsylvania State Professor Rob Frieden argues that, "Cable op-
erators have largely thwarted the Congressional mandate to give consumers
alternatives to the operator-leased devices."3
Such views of the matter are questionable in many respects. First, the FCC
mostly regulates the prices of the set-top box at cost.8 Furthermore, the agency
seems more concerned that equipment prices are subsidized rather than marked
up well above costs.85 Therefore, the "huge fees" point is invalid to the extent
that it possesses a market power connotation. Second, there is neither evidence
nor argument supporting the notion that the set-top box offers any increase in
market power to the cable industry. 6 As such, there is no reason to suspect that
the industry's behavior with respect to the set-top box is either anticompetitive
or anti-consumer. Third, to the extent that the industry has impeded the Cable-
Card's development, such efforts may be driven by legitimate business and
social concerns. Indeed, the FCC freely admitted that the CableCard regime
80 In re Video Device Competition; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices; Compatibility Be-
tween Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Comments of Free Press, MB
Docket No. 10-91; CS Docket No. 97-80; PP Docket No. 00-67, at 3 (July 13, 2010) (acces-
sible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
81 Marvin Ammori, Copyright's Latest Communications Policy: Content-Lock-Out and
Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 375, 388 (2010).
82 In re Video Device Competition; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices; Compatibility Be-
tween Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Comments of Pub. Knowledge
& New American Found., MB Docket No. 10-91; CS Docket No. 97-80; PP Docket No. 00-
67, at 6 (July 13, 2010) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System) (citing
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 57-58 (2005)).
83 Rob Frieden, Lock Down on the Third Screen: How Wireless Carriers Evade Regula-
tion of Their Video Services, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 819, 834 (2009).
8 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 88 (the Commission noted that Congress,
in Section 623(b)(3), made clear that equipment used to deliver regulated services must be
priced to the consumer at cost).
85 Id. 85-87.
86 See discussion infra Part V Section A.
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might lead to higher costs and prices for equipment. 7 Under this "foot drag-
ging" theory, a legitimate question to contemplate is whether the industry
should be condemned for impeding the CableCard or whether the FCC should
be condemned for mandating it. The answer lies in the relative efficiency of
self-supply to regulatory-induced commercial supply, and whether the incen-
tives of the MVPDs in this regard can be trusted. These questions will be ad-
dressed in the following text.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF THE SET-TOP BOX
Multichannel video providers, such as cable and satellite television opera-
tors, are in the business of selling subscriptions to multichannel video ser-
vices." In most cases, these services require that a piece of equipment, a set-
top box, be located at the consumer's home or business. The primary purpose
of this box is to convert the video signal (in some cases a scrambled signal for
security) to a standardized output accepted by consumer premises equipment
(i.e., television sets); the boxes are also used to order and provision video-on-
demand, display channel guides, and some other features. These set-top boxes
are manufactured by consumer electronics manufacturers (e.g., Pace, Cisco,
Motorola, Arris, and so forth) and acquired by consumers from their chosen
MVPD. MVPDs are not vertically integrated into the manufacturing of such
equipment.89 A monthly fee for the box (about $7- 10 per month), which typi-
cally includes an "insurance" service as well, since defective equipment is typ-
ically replaced without fee, is charged for the box." Thus, this "insurance"
87 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, 4.
88 DirecTV, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 3 (Feb. 25, 2010) (accessible via SEC Elec-
tronic Filing System) ("We are a leading provider of digital television entertainment in the
United States and Latin America. Our two continuing business segments, DIRECTV U.S.
and DIRECTV Latin America, which are differentiated by their geographic location, are
engaged in acquiring, promoting, selling and/or distributing digital entertainment program-
ming via satellite to residential and commercial subscribers"); Comcast Corp., Annual Re-
port (Form 10-K), I (Feb. 23, 2010) (accessible via SEC Electronic Filing System) ("We are
a leading provider of video, high-speed Internet and phone services ('cable services'), offer-
ing a variety of entertainment, information and communications services to residential and
commercial customers") [hereinafter Comcast, Annual Report].
89 However, it is worth noting that today most DBS-related equipment is MVPD brand-
ed. See Competition and Consumer Choice in the MVPD Marketplace, Including an Exami-
nation of Proposals to Expand Consumer Choice, such as A La Carte and Theme-Tiered
Offerings: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet), available at http://commcns.org/U45Cao.
90 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 1 13. See also DIRECTV, http://commcns.org/Vmn3D (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012); DISH, http://commcns.org/I Ohm I w8 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). By
comparison, wireless companies typically charge a $4.99 monthly premium for replacement
of mobile telephone equipment, but this includes a $50-150 deductible. AT&T Mobile In-
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service provided by the MVPD is valuable. For cable operators, the prices are
regulated to (some measure of) cost plus a return of 11.25 percent.9
In this section, we consider the economic incentives of a multichannel video
provider with regard to the set-top box, and discuss how such incentives relate
to the implementation of Section 629. In the AllVid NOI, the FCC contends
that Section 629 could lead to "[c]ompetition in the manufacturing and distri-
bution of consumer devices" as Congress envisioned.92 The alleged benefits of
such competition are "innovation, lower prices and higher quality."93 In light of
this view of Section 629, we model price and quality choices of the multichan-
nel video provider with regard to services and boxes. Also, in an effort to ad-
dress the belief that the multichannel video providers have intentionally frus-
trated the development of a competitive market for set-top box equipment,94 we
evaluate the provider's preference for self- versus market-supply of the boxes.
The model mimics the typical transaction by assuming a consumer purchases a
multichannel video service, which requires the use of a set-top box. Since mar-
ket power is often argued to drive the behavior of multichannel video providers
with regard to the set-top box, we assume the video provider is a monopolist."
A. Basic Theoretical Setup
We consider the case of a single provider of a service, S, produced at a con-
stant per unit cost of s. Each consumer decides whether or not to buy the ser-
vice, depending on his or her valuation of it. In order to obtain the service,
however, the consumer must also procure a converter or "set-top box", B, and
this box can, in theory, be produced or provided either by the multichannel
video provider or by an outside "retail market" source. Thus, the service S and
surance, AT&T, http://commcns.org/WKRekf (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) ("Effective Oct.
4, 2011, the premium will increase to $6.99 per enrolled mobile number").
91 See, e.g., Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 6 (Feb. 26, 2010)
(accessible via SEC Electronic Filing System) ("In accordance with FCC rules, the prices
we charge for video cable-related equipment, such as set-top boxes and remote control de-
vices, and for installation services, are based on actual costs plus a permitted rate of return
in regulated markets.").
92 AIIVidNOI, supra note 2, 23.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 We recognize that MVPDs are not monopolists, as each faces competition from at
least two other providers in nearly all geographic areas. DirecTV and Dish Network have
nearly ubiquitous coverage in the continental United States. See, e.g., In re CoxCom dbla
Cox Communications Phoenix, Petition for Determination of Effective Competition in Vari-
ous Arizona Communities, DA 10-2247, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Nov. 29,
2010) (finding that the Phoenix market was "effectively competitive" for purposes of price
deregulation under Section 623(1) of the Act because of competing service provided by two
DBS providers, DirectTV and Dish Network).
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the box B are perfect complements, neither having value without the other.
Consumers value the S and B combination, and are assumed to buy it if the
full price is less than the associated valuation. Letting p be the price paid for
service S, and r the price of the box B, consumer i buys service if vi > p + r.
We assume there are many consumers, and that their valuations, v, are distrib-
uted randomly, with cumulative density F(v), marginal density J(v), and with
support on the interval [0, oo). Thus, for the price system (p, r), the proportion
of consumers who buy S and B is just [1 - F(p + r)] > 0.
B. Optimal Prices
We begin by considering the profit-maximizing pricing problem of a service
provider who also is the sole seller of the boxes. Thus, consumers must buy
both S and B from the service provider, paying prices p and r determined by
this provider without restriction. How would such a provider set prices, and
would the seller's monopoly power over the box market prove important for
the outcome? The well-known answer is "No", due to the perfect complemen-
tarity of S and B: the seller gains no advantage from its control of the box
market and only the combined price (p + r) is determined by profit maximiza-
tion. To see this, let b be the per box cost of the seller, and let s be the per cus-
tomer cost of service. The service provider's profit is:
7Et=[1-F(p+r)](p+r-b-s), (1)
and the firm selects p and r to maximize this expression. This problem,
though, is partially degenerate in that only the sum (p + r) is determined by this
exercise. In other words, the component prices p and r are individually irrele-
vant to profit, and the firm can select any combination of p and r that sum to
the value determined by the maximization. Thus, let z =p + r, and write profit
as:
7t=[1-F(z)](z-b-s), (2)
Maximization of (2) with respect to z yields the following condition:
[1 - F(z)] - f(z)(z- b -s) = 0, (3)
where these expressions are to be evaluated at z*, the optimal solution.
Thus, any prices (p*, r*), that satisfy the condition z* =p* + r* are profit max-
imizing. Let us denote the profit-maximizing profits from z* as n*.
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C. Consumer Surplus
Consumer welfare will be taken to be equal to total consumer surplus in this
market. This total surplus is the sum of individual surplus over the mass of
consumers purchasing the service. The expression for consumer welfare,
CS(z), is given by:
CS(z) = z(V - z)f(v)dv, (4)CSz)
We note that consumers always benefit from a reduction in the total price of
service:
acs- [1- F(z)]_O. (5)az
This analysis, although somewhat simple, illustrates several important
points, some of which we will turn to now. There are two main features of the
model to keep in mind. First, since the service and box are consumed together,
consumers care only about the sum of the prices, or z. Second, consumers al-
ways prefer a lower aggregate price z; if z falls, then consumers benefit.
D. Effect of Regulated Set-Top Box Prices
In most cases for the cable television industry, the price of the set-top box is
regulated at a cost-plus 11.25 percent return. What is the effect of this regula-
tion? Suppose that the regulated price is r'. Being free to set the price for ser-
vice, the seller would just set p* = z* - r' so that profits and consumer surplus
would be unchanged. The single price p is sufficient to extract all available
profits for the seller. Note that it is irrelevant what price is set by regulation for
the box (such as r'= b as in the existing regulation); since the full price is z =p
+ r, any modification to r can be offset by a corresponding change in p.
E. Competitive Supply
We consider next the existence and effects of a competitive alternative sup-
ply of set-top boxes. Suppose that this competitive market supply is infinitely
elastic at a price of rm.9 The effect of this circumstance on the seller and con-
sumers depends, of course, on what rm is, and particularly whether rm is larger
or smaller than b, the service provider's cost per box. We assume that the ser-
vice provider and the competitive suppliers of boxes offer identical boxes, so
that the competitive sellers capture the entire box market if rm < r, and sell no
96 That is, consumers can purchase all they care to at price rm.
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boxes otherwise. Let ntm be the service provider's optimal profit with competi-
tive supply price rm. We have the following:
Proposition 1: T > n *; MVPD profits are never lower with market supply
than self-supply.
Proof If the service provider sets a price r < rm, and sets p* = z* - r, then
he obtains the profit nt*, so he can always assure himself of this profit level.
However, if rn < b, then he can do even better. To see this, suppose the seller
sets Po = z* - rm, and sets r at any level above rm, so he sells no boxes. In this
case his profit is:
no = [1 - F(z*)I(po - s) (6)
Since P0 > z* - b, we have t0 > [1- F(z*)](z * -b - s) = nt*. Thus, when-
ever rm < b, we have rtm > t0 > t *. Q.E.D.
The proof demonstrates that MVPDs may prefer that set-top boxes be provi-
sioned by a commercial market rather than by self-supply if the commercial
market can supply such equipment more efficiently than can the MVPDs. In
fact, the proof understates the case somewhat, since the pricing policy p =po
described above is not the optimal policy with competitive supply at a price
below the service provider's own costs. An optimal pricing rule can lead to
profits even higher than those at Po when rm < b.
Consider the seller's optimal response to competitive box supply at a price
rm that is below the seller's own cost level b. We know from the proof of
Proposition (1) that, if rm < b, the seller will do better by surrendering the box
market to the competitive suppliers. Hence, the total price faced by consumers
would be z =p + rm and the revenue received by the service provider per cus-
tomer would be (z - rm). Formally, the service provider selects z to maximize
profit given rm:
n(z;rm) = [1- F(z)](z- r. -s) (7)
This parameterized and unconstrained optimization problem exhibits com-
plementarity in the objective function:
a2nta -at f(z)>0. (8)
Thus, the objective function in (7) possesses strictly increasing differences
between z and the parameter rm. Standard results in lattice programming imply
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that the optimizing solution will be an increasing function of the parameter
rm. 7 If we let zm(rm) denote the optimal solution to this unconstrained maxi-
mization problem, then we have that zm(rm) is an increasing function. A direct
comparison of (2) and (7) yields the immediate fact that zm(b) equals z*. Thus,
if rm < b, we have that zm(rm) < z*. Hence, consumers face a lower total price
and, by Expression (5), consumer welfare will be higher.
This result, combined with Proposition 1, has the following significance.
When the service provider behaves optimally, and efficient competitive suppli-
ers provide the box at a price rm < b (the service provider's box cost), the ser-
vice provider will welcome the competitive supply, which will increase his
profits. Further, the full price of service to the customers is declining in the
level of the competitive box cost rm. Thus, any reduction in such costs serves
consumers and the firm alike, and the firm has no incentive to block such sales.
F. Incentive to Reduce Set-Top Box Costs and Prices
In the previous section, we showed that the MVPDs prefer a commercial
market for set-top boxes when such an arrangement is more efficient and leads
to lower equipment prices for consumers. We show here that MVPDs likewise
will pursue cost reductions that reduce equipment prices to consumers. Noting
that dir/dz = 0 at the optimal choice z*, simple differentiation shows:
a (1-F(z*)) < 0. (9)
Ob
Thus, the service provider would welcome any reduction in the cost of B
(such as a reduction in b to b' < b, say), since the reduction will result in in-
creased seller profits. The Commission, therefore, should expect video provid-
ers to seek low cost and efficient production of their set-top equipment.
It is also the case that a lower cost for set-top equipment increases consumer
welfare. Notice that the objective function in (2) exhibits strictly increasing
differences between z and b. The optimal aggregate price, z*, will be an in-
creasing function of box cost:
az*->0. (10)a~b
We know from Expression (5) that consumer welfare is determined by z*.
Since lower box costs increase profits, lower total prices, and increase con-
sumer welfare, lower box costs increase overall economic welfare. In the case
of costs, therefore, the incentives of multichannel video provider are in line
97 See, e.g., DONALD M. ToPKIS, SUPERMODULARITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY (1998).
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with the interest of consumers and economic welfare. Both the CableCard and
AllVid proposals have been based on the idea that a retail market for such set
top equipment may reduce the cost of such devices, but this argument implies
that the multichannel video providers are not interested in cost reductions,
which we have just shown is a false view.
G. Incentive to Innovate
Another argument used by the Commission to support both its CableCard
and AllVid creations is that such actions will "spur innovation." '8 Embedded in
this reasoning is that multichannel video providers do not have adequate incen-
tive to innovate. We turn now to the important problem of market innovations
that increase consumer valuation of the service S, rather than decreasing the
cost of the box. Although there are many ways one might represent such a
change in valuation due to some innovation in service (e.g., proportional in-
creases in values, first order dominating shifts in the valuation distribution, and
so on), the simplest and most obvious way is merely to assume that the new
innovation raises all consumers' valuation levels by some positive amount "e"
(i.e., an enhancement). Although simple, this formulation allows for a very
clear view of the effects of such value enhancement on the welfare of consum-
ers and the service provider when both behave optimally.
With the enhancement e, consumer i will buy service if vi + e >p + r. This
is equivalent to the inequality vi > p + (r - e). Thus, technically speaking, we
can directly translate the enhancement into our previous analysis simply by
absorbing it into the box price (r). Hence, let re = (r - e) and define z = p + re.
The service provider's profits are:
nt(z;re) = [1 -F(z)](z - re - s) (1)
Next, we let ze(re) denote the maximization of this profit function with re-
spect to z, given the parameter re. Noting the exact similarity between (11) and
(7), we can use (8) to conclude immediately that ze(re) is an increasing func-
tion. Since re < r and z* = ze(r), we have that ze(re) < z*. Recalling from (5)
that CS is a decreasing fumction, we conclude that CS(ze(re)) > CS(z*).99 Con-
sumer welfare increases if the market provides a technologically enhanced box.
The service provider's profit also increases when the competitive market
provides an enhanced box. Since ze(re) is optimal and re < r, we have that
98 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, at 14,708 (statement of Chairman J. Gena-
chowski). P 0
99 Note that Jp r-e(V + e -p - r)f(v)dv = (v - Ze)f(v)dv = CS(Ze).
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7(z(re);r.) > c(z*;re) > 7(z*;r) = n* (12)
The service provider has no incentive to block the competitive market's en-
hanced box as it clearly provides greater profit opportunities. Any enhance-
ment that increases consumer valuation is seen to result in both increased seller
profits and increased buyer welfare. Thus, if such an enhancement were avail-
able, then the service provider would welcome its introduction and consumers
would benefit as well.
We have established that MVPD providers will actively pursue cost reduc-
tions and innovations in a manner consistent with consumer interests. Of
course, all available cost reductions or imaginable innovations may not be pur-
sued, since in some cases the two may be at odds: a better box may be a more
costly box; or, a cheaper box may be a less sophisticated box. In any case, the
tradeoffs are apparent. If the innovation increases demand sufficiently enough
to warrant a higher cost (and thus a higher price), then it will be pursued. If
not, then it will not."° While we do not model variations in the capabilities of
set-top boxes (e.g., high-definition functionality, digital video recording, and
so forth), MVPD providers offer a variety of boxes, with different costs and
prices that suit the needs of particular customers.'
V. EVIDENCE AND ANECDOTES
In the previous section, we presented a formal economic analysis of set-top
boxes that provides a number of significant insights. In contrast to the common
view, our theoretical analysis reveals that the set-top box conveys no market
power to the MVPD and that the MVPD has no anticompetitive preference for
100 See, e.g., George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Efficiency
Risk of Network Neutrality Rules, POLICY BULLETIN No. 16 (Phoenix Ctr. for Advanced
Legal & Econ. Pub. Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.), May, 2006, at 9, available at
http://commcns.org/V8i33R. As is well known, the private gains from innovation may be
less than the social gains. As such, firms typically under-invest in innovation. This underin-
vestment is a general phenomenon and is not limited to the cable industry or the set-top box.
See generally T. Randolph Beard, George. S. Ford, Thomas. M. Koutsky & Lawrence. J.
Spiwak, A Valley of Death in the Innovation Sequence: An Economic Investigation, 18 RE-
SEARCH EVALUATION 343, 343-56 (2009) (regarding the general problem of underinvestment
in innovation). To our knowledge, there is no evidence (of which we are aware) to suggest
that the general incentive to innovate in the multichannel video industry is diminished rela-
tive to that in other industries due to the divergence of private and social gains.
101 See In re Video Device Competition, Implementation of Section 304 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Compatibil-
ity Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Comments of Cisco Sys-
tems, Inc., M.B. Docket No. 10-91, CS Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, at 11 (July
13, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/YbLoiH (accessible via FCC Electronic Com-
ment Filing System) (recognizing "there has been an explosion in the number and use of
over-the-top video devices and services over the past several years").
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self-supply. The MVPD simply prefers whatever market arrangements most
efficiently deliver the equipment to its consumers. Our analysis reveals that if
the equipment can be made cheaper and offered at a lower price, then the
MVPD will embrace the cost reduction. Also, if the set-top devices can be
made more innovatively to increase the value to consumers, then the MVPD is
incentivized to implement that innovation. These theoretical results directly
conflict with the common view of the service-equipment relationship in the
multichannel video market, which is the view held by the FCC as it formulates
its Section 629 strategy. °2 However, this "common view" is devoid of any
economic foundation, and is, thus, dubious.
In this section, we provide evidence and anecdotes supporting the general
themes of our theoretical analysis. A lack of data does not permit a formal
econometric analysis of our theory. Nevertheless, there is good evidence to
suggest that the theory has value, and we present some of that evidence below.
A. Equipment is Not a Tool for Surplus Extraction
Some potent evidence supporting this theory comes from the archetype
equipment model specified by the FCC-the broadband cable modem. 3 In-
deed, the National Broadband Plan observes, inter alia, that broadband mo-
dems are an "analog for innovation in set-top boxes" because a cable modem
"provides all network functions" and "connects via a standardized Ethernet
port to numerous devices consumers can buy at the store-including PCs,
game consoles, digital media devices and wireless routers."'" In so doing, ar-
gues the Commission, "innovation can happen on either 'side' of that device
without affecting the other side."'0' Similarly, in the AllVid NOI, the agency
argues, "Ethernet and the IEEE 802.11 standards have led to nationwide inter-
operability for customer data networks while allowing broadband service pro-
viders to deploy differing proprietary network technologies."'0 6 Plainly, the
FCC believes that the retail acquisition of the set-top box can and should be
like the broadband modem.
What is interesting about the FCC's analogy is that, like set-top boxes, the
broadband modem is a piece of equipment provided by broadband providers
(including MVPDs) that is inextricably linked to the provider's service. If, as
some claim, the self-supply of equipment is an important instrument for sur-
plus extraction, then we would expect to see the MVPDs (and other broadband
102 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
103 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 50, fig. 4-1.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 17.
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providers) behave similarly with regard to the modem as they do the set-top
box. Yet, the MVPDs who also provide broadband services permit, without
interference or constraint, the customer's acquisition of broadband modems in
the commercial market. Both cable and DSL broadband modems can be pur-
chased at big-box stores such as Best Buy. "7 This fact indicates that the
equipment itself is not a source of market power for MVPDs, as our theory
implies. Furthermore, most consumers continue to lease cable modems despite
the presence of a competitive retail market for such devices. 8 It appears, from
the FCC's own analogy, that the demand for commercial alternatives to leased
equipment is low.
Why, then, are there substantially more cable modem options for consumers
at retail than there are with the set-top box?" One explanation for that differ-
ence is that, although a commercial market is equally as efficient as self-supply
for broadband modems, self-supply, all things considered, is the more efficient
arrangement for set-top boxes. The relative efficiency of self-supply may arise
from conditional access and security and theft concerns, some of which are
driven by contractual relationships with copyright owners." Such concerns are
not generally relevant for broadband modems."'
Analogies are often useful, but the FCC's search for a suitable analogy for
the set-top box-whether it is the telephone or the data modem-is largely
pointless. The relative efficiency of self-supply versus commercial-supply of
equipment may vary substantially across industry sectors and services. Differ-
ent outcomes should be expected and regulatory-induced homogeneity renders
no apparent benefit. The agency should then, at a minimum, study the root
causes of these differences, without pre-judgment, and use this knowledge to
107 In fact, two of the authors of this paper are using their own personal cable modem to
receive broadband service from cable operators.
108 NPB Public Notice, n.3-4.
109 Id.
110 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 22; In re Video Device Competition; Implementation of
Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Naviga-
tion Devices; Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment,
Comments of AT& T, Inc., MB Docket No. 10-91, at 51-57 (July 13, 2010) (accessible via
FCC Electronic Comment Filing System); In re Video Device Competition; Implementation
of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Naviga-
tion Devices; Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment,
Reply Comments of DIRECTV, Inc., MB Docket No. 07-269, at 16-23 (June 8, 2011) (acces-
sible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
... NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 50, fig. 4-1 (discussing that the agency
itself concedes that with a cable modem, "PC manufacturers do not need to sign non-
disclosure agreements with broadband service providers, license any intellectual property
selected or favored by broadband service providers or get approval from any broadband
service providers or any non-regulatory certification bodies to develop or sell their PCs at




guide policy rather than simply presume the outcome in one market will be
transferable to another.
B. Now You See It, Now You Don't in DBS
In its Navigation Devices Order, the FCC decided that satellite video pro-
viders, such as DirecTV and EchoStar, were not required to comply with the
FCC's separate security rules."' The Commission's rationale is particularly
important to review in detail:
[D]ifferences in the marketplace for DBS equipment, where devices are available at
retail and offer consumers a choice, as compared to equipment for other MVPD ser-
vices, particularly cable operators, provide justification for not applying the rule re-
quiring separation of security functions to DBS service. We are reluctant to imple-
ment a rule that could disrupt an evolving market that is already offering consumers
the benefits that derive from competition. In the DBS environment, there are three
service providers and at least ten equipment manufacturers competing to provide
programming and equipment to consumers. The equipment is available at retail
stores. The result, over a relatively short time frame, has been lower equipment prices,
and enhanced options and features. Requiring DBS providers to [comply with the sep-
arate security rules] would serve a limited purpose and disrupt technical and invest-
ment structures that arose in a competitive environment. 113
At the time of this decision, it was true that DBS equipment was made by a
wide variety of manufacturers and could be purchased in numerous retail out-
lets.' 4 Not today. Nearly all DBS equipment is now MVPD-branded, though
still available at big box retailers and smaller outlets. However, when a con-
sumer purchases the DBS service, the equipment is treated as "leased."" 5 The
evolution of the service-equipment relationship in DBS is highly relevant. The
move from a commercial to a leased self-supply model in the DBS sector
"arose in a competitive environment."''6
As such, the evidence points to the conclusions that the self-supply model is
relatively more efficient than the retail model, since inefficiency is not toler-
ated by competition. We recognize this is but one interpretation of these facts,
but it seems apparent that some consideration by the FCC as to the causes of
112 Id.
113 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 64.
114 Id. 65.
115 Linda Moss, DirecTV's New Lease on Life, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Jan. 23, 2006);
DirecTV Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 26, 2009) ("Most set-top re-
ceivers provided to new and existing subscribers are leased subsequent to the introduction of
the lease program on March 1, 2006"); Dish Network Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
4 (Mar. 1, 2010) ("We incur significant upfront costs to provide our new subscribers with
in-home equipment, including advanced HD and DVR receivers, which most of our new
subscribers lease from us. While we seek to recoup such upfront equipment costs mostly
through monthly fees, there can be no assurance that we will be successful in achieving that
objective.").
116 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 64.
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this significant change in the service-equipment relationship in the DBS sector
is warranted before substantially expanding the scope of its Section 629 ef-
forts.
C. The Cost of Set-Top Boxes
A reduction in cost for set-top boxes is significant for the industry. Cable
operators' largest annual capital expense is consumer premises equipment
(video boxes, VolP equipment, and broadband modems), representing more
than half of total capital expenditures. Lease fees do not always recover these
costs." 7 Table 1 provides the figures for Comcast and Charter Communica-
tions."' As explained by Charter, "[d]uring 2010, we expect capital expendi-
tures to be approximately $1.2 billion. We expect the nature of these expendi-
tures will continue to be composed primarily of purchases of customer premise
equipment related to telephone and other advanced services."" 9 Our theory
shows that firm profits rise when set-top box costs fall, so the industry will
actively seek to minimize the cost of the equipment and, in turn, minimize the
price to consumers. Given the significant share of capital costs, cost reductions
are likely to be significant to both MVPDs' profits and their consumers' well-
being.
Table 1. Distribution of Capital Expeditures
Comcast Charter
Customer Premises Equip- 2,934 (58%) 593 (52%)
ment
Scalable Infrastructure 855 (17%) 216 (19%)
Line Extensions 120 (2.4%) 70 (6%)
Upgrade/Rebuild 421 (8.4%) 28 (2.5%)
Support Capital 356 (7.1%) 227 (20%)
Commercial Services 351 (7%) ...
Total Capital Expenditures 5,037 1,134
Source: Comcast and Charter 2009 Form 10-K.
There is more empirical evidence to support this conclusion. As observed in
the AllVid NOI, the FCC has granted waivers "to cable operators in financial
17 See, e.g., Dish Network Corp., Annual Report, supra note 115, at 4.
118 Comcast, Annual Report, supra note 88; Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Annual Report,
supra note 91.
119 Charter Comnc'ns, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 91, at 50.
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distress" 2 ° and in cases rendering "substantial public interest benefits by sig-
nificantly reducing cost."'' Plainly, if waivers are granted in cases of financial
distress and provide benefits in the form of reduced costs, then the existing
CableCard regime must be costly; cable companies are better off financially
with a waiver, in part because they can offer lower priced equipment to con-
sumers to expand their subscriptions. As noted above, the Commission admit-
ted before the D.C. Circuit that its integration ban may increase the cost of set-
top boxes in the short-run.'22 The agency's promise of an offset in the form of
lower prices and more innovation never materialized, but the higher prices and
costs did.
D. The Industry Supports a Commercial Market
While the MVPD industry is uniformly against the FCC's strict control of
set-top box design and evolution by way of its AllVid mandate, the industry
does not appear to be opposed to a commercial market for set-top equipment,
or even opposed to some of the functionality embedded in the AllVid device.
For example, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association
("NCTA") states,
Our industry is committed to providing content to consumers where and when they
want it, on all possible consumer devices, and for those devices to be innovative plat-
forms for new applications. We want consumers to be able to buy video devices at re-
tail and to know that cable content can be among their video sources.
123
The NCTA outlines seven principles to which cable operators are commit-
ted, including, but not limited to, the principle that "consumers should have the
option to purchase video devices at retail that can access their multichannel
provider's video services without a set-top box supplied by that provider."'24
Included in its lists of potential solutions is "delivery from the 'cloud' without
the need for any dedicated receiving device."'25
The industry does, however, comprehend the complexity of the issue. For
example, as the NCTA states,
[W]ell-crafted solutions must account for how content providers license programming
120 AlIVid NOI, supra note 2, 9.
121 Id.
122 Comcast Corp, FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
123 In re Video Device Competition, Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecomm.
Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Compatibility Between Cable
Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Comments of the Nat 7 Cable and Tele-
comm. Ass'n. on the Commission's Notice of Inquiry, MB Docket No. 10-91, CS Docket
No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, at Exhibit A (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter Comments of
Nat 'l Cable and Telecomm. Ass 'n].
124 Id. at 2.
125 Id. at 30.
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to distributors, how all video providers associate security, transactional, advertising,
and promotional elements with their video products, how consumer electronics manu-
facturers and retailers build support for new product categories, what consumers are
willing to buy rather than lease, and how to assure that solutions do not inadvertently
handicap future innovation. Solutions must also assure that, as Internet content is de-
livered over the television, it is afforded all of the copyright protections that apply
when it is delivered to the home computer.
126
Considering these (and other) complexities related to the technical delivery
of modem multichannel video services, it is not difficult to see why the self-
supply of set-top equipment is widely-viewed in the industry as more efficient
than a commercial market.
These statements are, as indicated from elements of the cable television in-
dustry, an industry many feel has intentionally given the CableCard short
shrift. There will surely be those that view these industry comments as disin-
genuous. However, our economic analysis encourages an alternative view,
perhaps a better explanation for the alleged difference between stated intent
and behavior with regard to set-top boxes is that the technical and practical
nuances of creating a commercial market for such equipment are greatly un-
derappreciated by industry outsiders, including the FCC.
An MVPD provider's line of business is selling video. As noted above, the
MVPDs are now exploring and implementing ways to deliver their program-
ming over an increasing number of devices (iPad, XBox, Wii, among others)
and using a wide variety of formats. Improving the set-top box, getting it into
the hands of consumers at lower prices, and possibly even eliminating the box
altogether, is plainly in the interest of the MVPD provider as long as such ac-
tions increase the consumers' willingness to pay for video services. In this
light, opposition to AllVid is not about the device's proposed functionality, or
about a competitive market for equipment. The opposition, it appears, arises
from ham-handed regulatory mandates for particular technological choices that
limit innovation and tend to raise the price for equipment (as did the Cable-
Card). Higher prices for equipment, absent an offsetting quality increase, are
not good for consumers or for MVPD providers.
E. Incentive to Innovate
Above we presented an economic model showing that the incentives of the
multichannel video provider with respect to the set-top box are compatible
with the desires of consumers and economic welfare in terms of innovation.
This view is consistent with the financial reporting of the cable industry. The
largest cable operator, Comcast, stated in its Form 10K filing, "[w]e are focus-
ing our technology initiatives on extending the capacity and efficiency of our
126 Id. Exhibit A.
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networks, increasing the capacity and functionality of advanced set-top boxes,
developing and integrating cross-service features and functionality, and devel-
oping interactive Internet protocol-based services." 127 In its annual financial
filings, Comcast also makes clear the harms to innovation that would flow
from an aggressive regulatory approach to implementing Section 629: "Some
of the alternative approaches [to Section 629], if adopted, could impose sub-
stantial costs on us and impair our ability to innovate." 2 ' Since the set-top box
is an essential component of many MVPD services, improving the set-top box
is an important goal of the industry. Giving customers high-cost, low-quality
set-top boxes reduces the demand for service, and thus reduces profits. As we
have shown above, even a monopolist would not pursue such a strategy. More-
over, there is no good reason to suspect that outside vendors will have more
interest in innovation than multichannel video providers since the video pro-
viders directly earn profits from the business, so a forced commercial market
for set-top boxes is unlikely to generate much benefit in this regard.'29
VI. CAVEAT: THE CASE OF VARIABLE PROPORTIONS
The analysis presented above assumes a one-to-one type consumer demand
for boxes B and service S. Although this appears to be a fairly restrictive as-
sumption, the applicability of the analysis to the case of a "continuous" number
of boxes can be easily demonstrated. The number of boxes used by a house-
hold may be some number greater than one.'3° Suppose that we retain our de-
mand set-up, with the addition of a representative consumer model for set-top
box demand. The immediate consequence of this formulation is that, while
consumers vary, as before, in their valuations of service (v varies as above),
consumers have identical demands for boxes or, somewhat less restrictively,
consumer welfare resulting from changes in box prices (or qualities) can be
sufficiently analyzed using the widely-applied representative consumer formu-
lation. This approach avoids the technical complications that necessarily arise
when we have differentiated households that exhibit possibly correlated valua-
tions for service and boxes. (It is quite unclear, a priori, how these preferences
should be represented in this more complex case.)
Given this set-up, a reinterpretation of the meaning of the box price r and
the enhancement variable e allows us to generalize the previous results in each,
127 Comcast, Annual Report, supra note 88, at 3.
128 Id. at 9.
129 Cf. Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLoGY 349
(2004) (discussing the source of innovation must rest in the "diversity" logic).
130 Comcast, Annual Report, supra note 88, at 6 ("On average, as of December 31, 2009,
each digital video customer had 2.0 digital set-top boxes, including digital transport adapt-
ers.").
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particularly when the service provider's box price is regulated. Specifically, it
is once again the case that the service provider and consumers would benefit
from a reduction in box "price" through competitive supply, and the service
provider would not block, but would welcome, a competitive provision of box-
es (if at a lower cost than self supply). Again, the incentives of the service pro-
vider, and those of consumers and society, would be well aligned.
We assume additional boxes increase the utility of the service by an amount
equal to the area under the inverse demand curve D(q), as illustrated in Figure
1. The cases where the box is supplied by the service provider at a cost-
regulated price (b) or provided by a competitive market at a price of bm can be
easily compared using our prior framework. Letting D(Q) = b and
D(Qm) = bm, the enhancement from boxes in each case is given by:
E= jD(q)dq (13)
E= D(q)dq (14)
Next, let r = (bQ - E) and rm = (bmQm - Em). We can now apply the prior
analysis to this situation noting that rm is less than r by an amount equal to the
shaded area in Figure 1.
Q Qm




The implication of this finding is immediate. Suppose that a competitive
supply of boxes emerges at a box price bm below the service provider's regu-
lated offering. Then the provider voluntarily yields the box market to the en-
trants, and the result of this action is effectively a reduction in the box "price"
r, as detailed above. From our prior analysis, we know that this results in in-
creased service provider profits and increased consumer welfare, so social wel-
fare increases. 3' Consumers respond to the lower box price by buying more
boxes, creating an additional benefit to service/equipment consumption.
While the set-top box prices for cable television operators are often regu-
lated, this is not the case for direct broadcast satellite providers. The satellite
providers are not subject to rate regulation under the provisions of the 1992
Cable Act or the 1996 Telecommunications Act; nor are they now required to
provide separate security functions in the form of a CableCard or similar de-
vice.'32
In the case of continuous demand, the freedom to set both service and box
prices gives rise to the potential for price discrimination.'33 Theoretically, the
discriminatory price vector for service and boxes could be anything. How price
discrimination would be used in the industry is theoretically ambiguous; it is
an empirical question. Fortunately, evidence is available. For satellite video
providers, a set-top box is required for each television, and the prices for these
boxes are unregulated. As a result, the case for discriminatory pricing leading
to high box prices is likely highest in the satellite industry. However, the evi-
dence does not support the use of such practices. For example, as of Septem-
ber 2012, Dish Network provides the standard set-top boxes at no additional
charge for some plans.'34 High Definition boxes are only $7.00 per month,
which is consistent with pricing in the regulated cable television industry."'
DirecTV offers the first receiver free with all service plans.'36 Notably, prior to
2006 DirecTV did not use a lease program, and a $5.00 fee applied to each
additional television in the customer's home (each set-top box requires a con-
verter card, so quantity can be measured).'37 Changing to a lease program did
not alter the pricing of additional television outlets, indicating that the set-top
box is not a useful tool for implementing price discrimination.
131 See discussion infra Part IV Section E.
132 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(b); CommercialAvailability I, supra note 13, 64.
133 For discussion of the FCC's purpose in enacting these rules, see Commercial A vail-
ability III, supra note 3, 1.
134 English Special Offers, DISH NETWORK, http://commcns.org/l 1C76x8 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012).
135 Set Up Your Televisions, DISH NETWORK (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
136 English Packages, DIRECT TV, http://commcns.orgNroaSa (last visited Nov. 10,
2012).
137 See DirecTV, Annual Report, supra note 88, at 50.
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VII. FACT-BASED LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR
SUNSET OF SECTION 629
Given the above, is there a compelling policy reason for the Commission to
continue with its quixotic attempt to try to develop a commercial retail market
for set-top boxes? The answer is clearly, no. As noted in preceding sections,
the FCC has repeatedly conceded that its "separable security" approach to Sec-
tion 629 is an uncontested failure; to try again seems, at this point, to be the
triumph of hope over experience. Moreover, the video market is presently un-
dergoing substantial transformation and experiencing rapid innovation.'39 As
such, the timing for a regulatory-mandated technology standard could not be
worse. Similarly, using regulation to force a commercial retail market is argua-
bly poorly motivated because providers have not demonstrated anti-
competitive behavior with regard to the set-top box. To the contrary, MVPDs
are strongly motivated to provide low-cost, high-feature set top equipment to
consumers, and regulation is unlikely to lower price, improve quality, or in-
crease innovation. Indeed, the Commission has repeatedly acknowledged that
its CableCARD rules increase prices and reduce network deployment. 40 Per-
haps most importantly, AllVid's ultimate failure is virtually inescapable be-
cause the commercial market envisioned under Section 629 is, today, ineffi-
cient, and markets abhor inefficiency.
We hold no monopoly on skepticism regarding the successful implementa-
tion of Section 629. Regarding CableCARD, Commissioner Michael Copps
observed, "[t]he intent, we all recall, was to spur on a competitive retail market
to provide consumers more choice. But it didn't happen. In many ways, the
outcome of our pursuit has been the opposite of what was intended.''. Com-
missioner Copps' take on the renewed effort, which he supports, is likewise
pessimistic--noting that the AllVid proposal is "a particularly ambitious
one""'42-- and comes with a warning: "I would just caution my colleagues on
138 See discussion infra Part III Section A.
139 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 1 13 ("[D]elivery platforms continue to evolve at a rapid
pace").
140 Commercial Availability II, supra note 45, 29 ("[Wle believe it is likely that con-
sumers will face additional costs in the short term as a result of the prohibition on integrated
navigation devices"); see also Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 41-42 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he FCC has
conceded that the integration ban may impose short-term costs on cable companies and
consumers").
141 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Compatibility Between Cable Systems and
Consumer Electronics Equipment, Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.R.
4275, 4326 (Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Commercial Availability Fourth NPRM] (statement
of Comm'r Copps).
142 Id. at 4327 (statement of Comm'r Copps).
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how much work and pushing from this Commission will be required to reach
the happy world of gateway device availability .... [T]he sad saga of the Ca-
bleCARD illustrates the pitfalls that await us at every corner."'43 Commissioner
Copps also suggests that success requires "true private sector-public sector
coordination and partnering," yet many in the private sector are opposed to
regulatory-mandated technology standards, including MVPDs, programmers
and other content suppliers.'" Success, therefore, faces significant hurdles.
Similarly, Commissioner McDowell observed that "technological innovation
continues to outpace the government's ability to keep up" and indicates he will
"6remain humble about the government's ability to predict the pace and direc-
tion of technological developments. If nothing else, our experience in imple-
menting Section 629 should remind us of the value of modesty in rulemak-
ing.'
45
Commissioner McDowell goes further by suggesting that given the diffi-
culty of implementing Section 629, "some may want to ask Congress to con-
sider new options.' 4 Congress need not be bothered to end the futile effort,
however, since the Act provides the Commission the authority to do so itself
by sunsetting the regulation. In this section, we set forth what we believe to be
sound economic, legal, and evidentiary arguments to support a sunset of Sec-
tion 629 under the relevant statutory provisions. First, we outline the parame-
ters of Section 629, and show that the ability to invoke the sunset provision
will hinge on how the Commission defines "fully competitive." Given that
Congress never provides a definition of "fully competitive," we next propose a
definition that is flexible, economically sound, suitable to the industry, and
relevant for evaluating the removal of regulation. In particular, we recommend
the use of an "effectively competitive" or "workably competitive" standard.
Finally, we apply this definition and find that there is a plausible legal and evi-
dentiary case for sunset.
A. Statutory Background
Section 629(a) of the Act directs the FCC to "adopt regulations ... to assure
143 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, at 14,709 (statement of Comm'r Copps).
I" See Comments of Nat'l Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n, supra note 123, at 33-43; In re
Video Device Competition, Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Compatibility Between Cable
Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Joint Reply Comments of Program Net-
works, M.B. Docket No. 10-91, CS Docket No. 97-80, PP Docket No. 00-67, at 2-6 (Aug.
12, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/UT5w2y.
145 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, at 4299 (statement of Comm'r McDowell).
146 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, at 14,711 (statement of Comm'r McDow-
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the commercial availability, to consumers of multichannel video programming
• .. of converter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and other
equipment used by consumers to access multichannel video programming...
from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with any mul-
tichannel video programming distributor."'47 Under Section 629(e), the Com-
mission may sunset these regulatory interventions upon making the following
determinations: "the market for the multichannel video programming distribu-
tors is fully competitive; the market for converter boxes, and interactive com-
munications equipment, used in conjunction with that service is fully competi-
tive; and elimination of the regulations would promote competition and the
public interest."'48 Plainly, sunset hinges largely on the definition of "fully
competitive" under Sections 629(e)(1) and (2), but the Act provides no formal
definition of the term.' 9 Nor is "fully competitive" a term of art in Economic
science. While the Commission has issued some preliminary dicta on how it
might define the relevant product and geographic markets for purposes of a
potential Section 629(e) petition,' it too has shied away from providing a def-
inition of "fully competitive."'' Given this lack of guidance and precedent, the
Commission has the flexibility to establish the parameters of the term "fully
competitive" to evaluate any petition for sunset; and the Commission's pa-
rameters would be given strong judicial deference under the Chevron doc-
trine.'52 In our view, the agency's definition of "fully competitive" should be
economically legitimate, reflect the economic realities of the communications
business, and correspond to the statutory objective of assessing the value of
economic regulation. We provide such a definition in the next section.
An analysis of the current state of competition under Sections 629(e)(1) and
(2) is not the sole consideration for sunset, however. Section 629(e)(3), which
focuses on the affirmative promotion of competition and the broader public
interest, clearly requires the agency to consider the burden of regulation on
economic outcomes. '53 Indeed, Congress recognized the potential that FCC
regulations under Section 629 could have "the effect of freezing or chilling the
development of new technologies and services"'54 or, just as importantly, per-
147 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
148 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
149 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (stating that regulations will "cease to apply when the Com-
mission" determines there is fully competitive behavior) (emphasis added).
150 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 111 ("The Commission has stated that the
relevant geographic market for assessing MVPD competition is local and its extent can be
defined by the overlap of the 'footprints' of the various service providers").
'5' Id. 109-113 affid, Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
152 See generally, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
153 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
154 See H.R. REp. No. 104-458, at 180-81 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
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haps be contrary to the public interest for other reasons.'55 Given that the stated
purpose of the 1996 Act was to reduce regulation whenever possible,'56 Section
629(e)(3) provides the opportunity to sunset a regulatory effort with little hope
of a positive net social return.
The Commission has not been silent on the statutory requirements for a sun-
set of Section 629. In its 1998 Navigation Devices Order, the agency addressed
the issue. Most of the discussion is non-committal and centers on market defi-
nition.'57 In that regard, the Commission defines "MPVD services" as the rele-
vant product market for purposes of 629(e)( 1)15 8 and "any navigation devices
subject to Section 629" as the relevant product market for navigation de-
vices.'59 This choice of market directly coincides with the statutory setup, and
is important in some respects (as discussed below). On geographic market
definition, however, the statute is silent, and the Commission has not made a
formal determination, but has discussed both narrow and wide market bounda-
ries. "
The agency has made two other findings of note. First, while the Commis-
sion did not require satellite providers to comply with the CableCARD integra-
tion ban, the Commission concluded that DBS was not wholly exempt from the
Section 629 mandate.' 6' Indeed, the agency intends for satellite providers to
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.
155 See id. (For example, the Commission is required to be "cognizan[t] of the current
state of the marketplace and consider the results of private standards setting activities" when
promulgating regulation).
156 The preamble of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to adhere to
a "pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework." See, S. REP. No. 104-230, at
113 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
157 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 110 ("a relevant product market and a
relevant geographic market must be determined and analyzed").
158 Id. (noting that "a relevant product market and a relevant geographic market must be
determined and analyzed and that "[f]or purposes of Section 629(e), the market for MVPD
programming services is an appropriate product market because the broader market defini-
tion encompasses the full range of MVPD services available to consumers").
159 Id. Ill ("With respect to the market for equipment, we conclude that any naviga-
tion device subject to Section 629 shall constitute the appropriate equipment market for
Section 629(e) purposes").
160 See discussion infra n. 151; see also Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 111
("The Commission has stated that the relevant geographic market for assessing MVPD
competition is local and its extent can be defined by the overlap of the 'footprints' of the
various service providers. We believe that local geographic markets, akin to Nielsen's 'areas
of dominant influence,' or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as determined by the
Office of Management and Budget, may be an appropriate geographic market definition").
161 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 112 ("[W]e cannot conclude that the rules
in their entirety should never be applied by virtue of the 'sunset' criteria ... Congress did
not exclude DBS from the reach of Section 629, even though the competitive state of DBS
services was known at the time of the enactment of the 1996 Act.").
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participate in its AllVid scheme. 62 Consequently, by the market definition dis-
cussion above, the equipment for satellite providers is part of the product mar-
ket for navigation devices.'63 Second, the agency does not reject the statutory
"effectively competitive" standard, as defined in Section 623(1), as a useful
analogy for Section 629(e)'s notion of "fully competitive." 64 As discussed
below, a definition of "effective competition" is a much more realistic standard
than "perfect competition," particularly in light of how the FCC has imple-
mented the "effective competition" standard.'65
B. How to Define "Fully Competitive"?
As noted above, the 1996 Act provides no direct statutory definition of "ful-
ly competitive" in the context of Section 629(e). Implementing the section,
therefore, requires the agency to assign meaning to the term. In this section, we
explore two possible definitions. At the extreme, the term "fully competitive"
could be associated with the textbook notion of "perfect competition." As we
have explained in prior research and do so again here, this definition is entirely
inappropriate for communications markets. " Perfect competition is a Nir-
vana-a theoretical perfection no real world market can attain. More sensibly,
we turn to the economic concept of "workably competitive" or "effectively
162 All Vid NOI, supra note 2, 1.
163 Id. at 4275, n.2 (defining a set-top video device, also known as a "smart video de-
vice," as a product that is capable of navigating the universe of video content traditionally
found in cable or satellite boxes) (emphasis added).
164 Commercial Availability 1, supra note 13, 113.
165 The effective competition standard likely would be satisfied under most geographic
market definitions given the ubiquitous presence of satellite video and its one-third share of
the national market (exceeding the 15 percent required share). In the 2009 Report on Cable
Industry Prices, 31.65 percent of subscribers are in communities that have applied for and
received designation as "Effectively Competitive" markets. See In re Implementation of
Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statis-
tical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Reprogramming Service, and
Equipment, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 26 F.C.C.R. 1769, 1786 (Feb. 14, 2011) (At-
tachment I) [hereinafter 2011 Report on Cable Industry Prices]. This figure likely under-
states the present share for a number of reasons. First, this figure is from the 2009 survey,
and this share is nearly double that from the last report in 2008 (18.1 percent). In re Imple-
mentation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service,
and Equipment, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 24 F.C.C.R. 259, 299 (Jan. 15, 2009)
(Attachment I-b). Second, in many cases, franchise authorities were not certified to regulate
cable rates, so an "Effectively Competitive" determination provides no benefits to the cable
system. Third, in some cases, the legal costs and the expense of obtaining highly local data
do not justify a petition.
166 See George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impossible Dream: Forbearance
After the Phoenix Order, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECONOMIC PUBLIC
POLICY STUDIES No. 10-08, Dec. 2010, at 8, available at http://commcns.org/KQVys8.
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competitive" to give meaning to the term "fully competitive." This approach is
consistent with earlier Commission findings on the sunset provision of Section
629(e). 67 Relying on these more practical concepts of competition, we are able
to construct a definition of fully competitive that is economically legitimate,
reflects the economic realities of the communications business, and corre-
sponds to the statutory objective of assessing the social value of economic reg-
ulation.
1. "Fully Competitive" Should Not Be Defined as "Perfectly Competitive"
It is not uncommon for the term "fully competitive" to be linked to the text-
book notion of "perfectly competitive," at least loosely. 6 In the context of
Section 629(e), this association would be a mistake. With perfect competition,
there are large numbers of perfectly-informed buyers and sellers free to enter
and exit the market at will, all engaged in transactions for a single, homogene-
ous product in a centralized market.'69 The long-run equilibrium in such a set-
ting has price equal to marginal cost and all firms, each identical to the others,
earn zero economic profit as a consequence of the free entry and exit condi-
tion.' Perfect competition is a useful theoretical benchmark for a frictionless
economy.' It is not, however, a useful benchmark for expected performance
in the communications industry. Moreover, the static outcomes of the model of
perfect competition ignore entirely the costs and benefits of regulation."" Sun-
set, and even forbearance more generally, addresses the need for regulation,
with full recognition that regulation may affect market outcomes in undesirable
167 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 3 (stating that "certain parameters are
necessary to ensure the movement of navigation devices toward a fully competitive mar-
ket").
168 COLIN ROBINSON, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN UTILITY MARKETS 135 (2003)
("The traditional textbook model of perfect competition generated a fully competitive out-
come."); MARY C. BRINTON & VICTOR NEE, THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 155
(1998); MILTON FRIEDMAN & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, PRICE THEORY 70-4 (2007). For a his-
torical review of the concepts of competition, see, e.g., George J. Stigler, Perfect Competi-
tion, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POLITICAL ECoN. 1, 1-17 (1957).
169 ROBERT B. EKELUND JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISION, ECONOMICS 206 (4th ed. 1994).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 206, 208.
172 See e.g., Win Whittaker, A Price-Level (Incentive) Regulation Proposal for Oil Pipe-
lines, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 415, 425 (1993) (quoting a book on regulation which points out that
the real costs of regulation "go far beyond the consequences of regulation for the cost of
doing business. Rather they include the impacts on domestic and international competition,
the impacts on capacity decisions, and the consequences for long-term industrial strategies.
In many industries that compete on bases other than cost, such as service, variety, or product
reliability, and undue focus on costs can miss much that is important to competitive impact.
Similarly, whatever value benefit/cost analysis might have as a basis for regulatory decision
making, it is inherently incomplete.").
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ways. Section 629(e)(3), for example, expressly recognizes that the regulation
may impede competition or may conflict with the public interest in other
ways.' Regulation is costly; any meaningful definition of competition used in
the context of a sunset or forbearance provision must account for that fact."'
The equilibrium outcome of primary interest from the model of perfect
competition of that price is equal to the marginal cost of production. Given the
high fixed and sunk costs necessary for the production of communications ser-
vices, '7 this outcome is entirely infeasible in communications markets. Price
must exceed marginal cost by a sufficient amount to cover the fixed costs of
production.' The Commission understands the supply-side conditions. In the
National Broadband Plan, for example, the agency observed, "building broad-
band networks-especially wireline-requires large fixed and sunk invest-
ments."'7 7 As a result, the agency concluded, "the industry will probably al-
ways have a relatively small number of facilities-based competitors," but also
that "the lack of a large number of ... providers does not necessarily mean
competition among broadband providers is inadequate."''
Indeed, perfect competition is a dubious benchmark, and this fact is well es-
tablished in literature on telecommunications regulation. In the TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS REGULATION HANDBOOK, for example, a discussion of costs and
pricing notes that:
[M]arginal cost is below average costs, and setting a regulated price equal to marginal
cost will not allow the operator to recoup all of its costs. In order for the operator not
to lose money and go out of business, the regulator had to set at least some prices
above marginal cost. 7 9
173 Congress was cognizant that regulation "could have the effect of freezing or chilling
the development of new technologies and services" and directed the Commission to take
into consideration different factors such as the current state of the marketplace. See H.R.
REP. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.
174 See e.g., William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications,
the Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Invest-
ment and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 138 (2000) (asserting that
"any regulation is costly to implement and likely to create various distortions that would not
occur if it were possible for competition to operate freely and perfectly"); Anita I. Anand,
Combating Terrorist Financing: Is Canada's Legal Regime Effective?, 61 U. TORONTO L.J.
59, 60 (2011) (regulation is "costly, and ineffective regulation imposes unnecessary costs on
the private and public sectors"); see also discussion infra Figure 1.
15 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 36.
176 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse ofAmerican Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 250
(2003).
177 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 36.
178 Id. at 36-37.
179 HANK INTVEN, JEREMY OLIVER & EDGARDO SEPULVIDA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REG-
ULATION HANDBOOK B- 17 (2000); see also CLEMENT G. KROUSE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
EcoNoMics 55 (1990) ("In a homogeneous goods industry the presence of increasing returns
in production creates difficulties in using perfect competition as a benchmark for social
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Plainly, the marginal cost outcome of the model of perfect competition is in-
compatible with markets with high fixed and sunk costs of production. Put an-
other way, marginal cost pricing does not create equilibrium in communica-
tions markets. As noted by Jean Tirole in reference to duopolistic competition,
"both firms charging the competitive prices, [price equals marginal cost], is
generally not an equilibrium."'' 0 Since the equilibrium of perfect competition is
never compatible with the equilibrium in communications markets-
including cable television-it seems clear that perfect competition is not a use-
ful benchmark.
This fact is not lost on the Commission. Indeed, there are many instances
where the FCC itself devises policy in full recognition of the prevalence of
fixed and sunk costs and their implications for pricing.'"' For example, when
the agency set a price for certain types of payphone calls, it concluded:
Because payphones have significant fixed costs that must be recovered, the price for
each type of payphone call must exceed the marginal cost of the call if the payphone
is to earn a normal rate of return. Stated another way, if every call is priced at the
marginal cost of that call, the payphone would be unprofitable, because it would fail
to recover the predominant fixed costs of providing the payphone.'
82
Likewise, in its 2008 SATELLITE COMPETITION REPORT, the agency ob-
served:
[M]etrics of the unit price-cost margin ... are difficult to interpret as indicators of
market power and the extent of competitive rivalry in industries where firms, such as
satellite carriers, utilize technologies with large fixed costs and substantial economies
of scale .... Pricing output at marginal cost ... is therefore unprofitable for satellite
firms, since such pricing will produce losses equal to the fixed costs of production."83
Even former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt observed:
In an industry with large sunk costs and small marginal costs, like most of the tele-
communications industry, pricing that goes to marginal cost will not provide an ade-
quate return to the investors who provide capital. Investors will be cautious about in-
vesting money upfront because ex post competition could drive prices to nonremu-
efficiency. Prices set equal to marginal cost in this case will lead to losses").
180 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 214 (1988).
181 See, e.g., NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 47 ("economies of scale,
scope and density that characterize telecommunications networks"); In re Review of Section
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978,
244 (Feb. 20, 2003).
182 In re Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, and Order on Re-
consideration of the Second Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2545, 33 (Jan. 28, 1999)
(footnotes omitted).
183 In re Second Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with
Respect to Domestic and International Satellite Communications Services, Second Report,
23 F.C.C.R. 15170, 90 (Oct. 14, 2008).
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nerative levels.'4
Plainly, the inapplicability of the model of perfect competition in communi-
cations markets is widely accepted. In fact, the price equals marginal cost out-
come could lead to a more direct legal challenge of using perfect competition
as a performance benchmark. For example, viewed in the context of the tradi-
tional "just and reasonable" ratemaking standard found in Section 201, ' to
define "fully competitive" as "perfectly competitive" sets a de facto bench-
mark standard which is "confiscatory" and outside of the "zone of reasonable-
ness," since marginal cost pricing does not permit the recovery of all costs in
communications markets characterized by high fixed and sunk costs.'86
In sum, while perfect competition is a legitimate theoretical concept, its pol-
icy relevance is less clear. Perfect competition is a textbook Nirvana that fails
to reflect the economic realities of the communications industry-and nearly
every other industry. The static outcomes of the perfectly competitive equilib-
rium are wholly incompatible with the supply-side economic conditions of the
communications markets. Furthermore, the static outcomes of perfect competi-
tion provide no insight into the statutory objective of assessing the value of
economic regulation. A narrow focus on price-cost margins says nothing about
the costs of regulation, and such costs should be contemplated by statute.
Moreover, the statute itself recognizes that the regulation may impede com-
petition and, therefore, a refusal to sunset the provisions due to a lack of com-
petitive perfection conflicts with congressional intent.'87 As discussed below,
economic research provides significant guidance on a more meaningful stan-
dard for the Commission to adopt when defining "fully competitive" under
Section 629(e).
2. "Fully Competitive" is Better Defined as "Effectively Competitive" or
"Workably Competitive"
Economists have long been dissatisfied with the rigid concept of perfect
competition as a standard for actual market outcomes. 88 Few, if any, markets
184 Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and Beyond,
58 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 6 (2006).
185 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
186 See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 481 (2002); Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v.
FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, the FCC is not always so judi-
cious in its acknowledgement and application of economic principles. For example, in its
recent Phoenix Forbearance Order, the agency establishes a marginal cost pricing standard
for Section 10 forbearance-a standard that will be impossible to satisfy. See Ford & Spi-
wak, The Impossible Dream, supra note 166, at 8.
187 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(e)(l)-(3).
188 See e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward A New
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are perfectly competitive, but this fact does not warrant widespread govern-
ment intervention. As a result, economists began to develop the concept known
as "workable" or "effective" competition."9 Generally, workable or effective
competition implies the absence of significant monopoly power, where the
adjective "significant" implies sufficient market power that would warrant the
costs of attempting to reduce it through antitrust or regulatory action.9
William Shepherd provides an excellent sketch of the issue in his book, THE
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:
The basic question is how many comparable competitors are needed for effective
competition: as many as 100 or 20 or eight, or instead as few as two? ...
What gives an effective degree of competition has been debated with increasing rigor
since Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776....
After 1870, neoclassical economists began to carry the concept of competition to its
pure, "atomistic" extreme, deriving the precise efficiency results found in beginning
economics texts .... Competition came to be defined as an equilibrium result en-
forced by the relentless pressures of numberless tiny competitors.
Practical-minded observers have long disapproved of such models as too abstract and
extreme. A strong degree of rivalry among several firms... can give the same general
degree of efficiency, while also providing for rapid innovation. This realistic view of
the competitive process among a few rivals is often said to conflict with the neoclassi-
cal analysis of equilibrium among numberless firms in atomistic markets....
Yet no such conflict over the true nature of competition really needs to exist....
[T]he aim has been only to have intense competition, so that firms are under strong
mutual pressure....
One cannot just count firms in judging the degree of competition....
At times, even if there are only two competitors, their rivalry may be intense. Though
one of the two firms may get the upper hand for a while in a market, the other may
soon fight back and equalize its share of the market and profits. Such a continuing
rugged rivalry may stir great efforts from the firms and force prices down close to the
levels of their costs. Therefore, effective competition is possible even when there are
as few as two or several firms.
... [C]ompetition is a process that can be effective when it is less comprehensive than
in the ideal, pure case. 191
Shepherd's observation that "even if there are only two competitors, their ri-
valry may be intense" and that "one cannot just count firms in judging the de-
gree of competition" is exceedingly relevant for communications markets
Model for US. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 81 (2007) (noting that
perfect competition is the wrong standard for market performance in high-fixed-cost indus-
tries and that some margin above incremental, variable cost is necessary); FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT § 1.1.24 (1921), available at
http://commcns.org/V8jT40 (asserting that "the problem of profit is one way of looking at
the problem of the contrast between perfect competition and actual competition.").
189 DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 100-01 (1995).
190 Id.
191 WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 9-10 (1985).
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where the supply-side characteristics often lead to relatively concentrated equi-
libriums.'92 Concentration, however, need not imply a lack of rivalry. In the
National Broadband Plan, the Commission concurs, concluding, as noted
above, that "the lack of a large number of... providers does not necessarily
mean competition among broadband providers is inadequate."' 93
Economist Jesse Markham provides an even more useful conceptualization
of the issue in the AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW:
A possible alternative approach to the concept of workable competition may be one
which shifts the emphasis from a set of specific structural characteristics to an ap-
praisal of a particular industry's over-all performance against the background of pos-
sible remedial action. Definitions of workable competition shaped along these lines
might accept as a first approximation some such principle as the following: An indus-
try may be judged to be workably competitive when, after the structural characteris-
tics of its market and the dynamic forces that shaped them have been thoroughly ex-
amined, there is no clearly indicated change that can be effected through public policy
measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses. Tautological
through [sic] this type of definition might be, it at least avoids the pitfall of listing
specific market conditions that can have very limited general applicability. Also, it
would ascribe paramount importance to that which should be uppermost in the minds
of those who formulate public policy-the possibility of prescribing appropriate re-
medial action. For, unless the concept of workable competition is to be an instrument
of public policy, there is little reason for differentiating between workable and pure
competition. But to frame definitions for public policy purposes without taking cogni-
zance of the different structural features among industries and within the same indus-
try at specific stages of development, and without recognizing at the outset the politi-
cal and economic limitations placed upon policymaking authorities, would be to ig-
nore the primary purpose of such definitions, i.e., to indicate wherein an industry does
not operate in the public's interest and what appropriate remedial action is possible. 94
Here we have a very sensible approach to assessing competition in the con-
text of a sunset provision (or forbearance more generally). Markham recom-
mends the joint assessment of "a particular industry's over-all performance,"
which includes not only the observed market outcomes but also the efficacy of
"possible remedial action."' 95 In other words, while we may observe prices in
excess of marginal cost, and perhaps by a sizeable amount, this outcome can-
not be viewed independent of the policymaker's ability to do something useful
about it. Put another way, a claim of a "market failure" is insufficient to war-
rant regulation or to postpone forbearance from regulation. Inseparable from
192 See id. at 10.
193 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 37; see also George.S. Ford, Thomas
M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Struc-
ture, and Convergence, 59 FED. COMM L.J. 331, 346-51 (2007) ("Empirical and experimen-
tal research has shown that there is substantial variation in the relationship between the
number of firms (or industry concentration) and prices/profits across industries and over
time.").
194 Jesse W. Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competi-




the market outcome is whether some change "can be effected through public
policy measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses.'
' 96
This notion of workable competition can be illustrated using a simple graph.
In Figure 1, we have a demand curve for a good, labeled D. There are three
prices: the monopoly price (PM), the duopoly price (PD), and the regulated
price (PR), with respective quantities Qi. Assume marginal cost is zero (MC)
and regulation imposes a fixed administrative burden set equal to the rectangu-
lar area R in the figure.'
If the choice is between monopoly and regulation (price-quantity combina-
tions PM, QM and PR, QR), then the welfare gains are equal to the abcde less
costs R, which is clearly positive. Alternately, if the choice is between duopoly
and regulation (price-quantity combinations PD, QD and PR, QR), the welfare
gain is only ce which is less than R. Thus, on economic welfare grounds (at
least in the partial equilibrium analysis), regulation is too costly in the case of
duopoly, even though regulation increases welfare in the case of monopoly.'98
Notably, the implementation of cable rate regulation was based on the rule
196 Id.
197 The choice of R is illustrative only and has nothing to do with the prices or quantities.
The costs of regulation could take many forms other than a fixed administrative cost. Also,
the cost of implementing regulation may be much higher in a duopolistic setting than under
monopoly conditions.
198 See T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak & Michael Stem, A
Policy Framework for Spectrum Allocation in Mobile Communications, 63 FED. COMM. L.J.
639,653 (2011), available at http://commcns.org/XhrXyT.
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PR = PD because rate reductions were based on the competitive differential.' 9
In all cases, prices are well in excess of marginal cost, illustrating that the
model of perfect competition offers little guidance on the question of the social
value of regulation.
Interestingly, a formal definition of "fully competitive" is provided in the
Encarta Dictionary. Encarta defines a fully competitive service as "a service for
which market forces are sufficiently strong to eliminate the need for govern-
ment regulation."2"0 This general definition is useful in that, as with Markham,
competition need not be textbook perfect to be fully competitive, just adequate
enough to eliminate the likelihood of welfare-improving remedial action by
either antitrust or regulation."' This definition is consistent with the logic un-
derlying the "effectively competitive" standard in Section 623(1).
This notion of workably or effectively competitive is supported directly by
the 1996 Act with regard to cable television markets. Specifically, Congress
permitted the elimination of rate regulation for basic tier MVPD programming
in markets that are subject to "effective competition.""2 Section 623(l)(1) de-
fines "effective competition" as:
A. fewer than 30 percent of the households in the franchise area subscribe to
the cable service of a cable system;
B. the franchise area is ... served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel
video programming distributors each of which offers comparable video pro-
gramming to at least 50 percent of the households in the franchise area; and
... the number of households subscribing to programming services offered
by multichannel video programming distributors other than the largest mul-
tichannel video programming distributor exceeds 15 percent of the house-
holds in the franchise area;
C. a multichannel video programming distributor operated by the franchising
authority for that franchise area offers video programming to at least 50 per-
cent of the households in that franchise area; or
D. a local exchange carrier or its affiliate (or any multichannel video program-
ming distributor using the facilities of such carrier or its affiliate) offers vid-
eo programming services directly to subscribers by any means (other than
direct-to-home satellite services) in the franchise area of an unaffiliated ca-
ble operator which is providing cable service in that franchise area, but only
19 See THOMAS HAZLETT & MATrHEW SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVI-
SION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 26-29 (MIT Press 1997) (discussing pricing ef-
fects in different markets).
200 ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2009); see also 2.3 Regulation in a Fully
Competitive Environment, ICT REGULATION TOOLKIT, http://commcns.org/l I C900E (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012) ("In a fully competitive environment, there is a more limited need for
regulation.").
201 Implicit is that market forces are sufficient to protect consumers and ensure just and
reasonable rates. Markham, supra note 193, at 361.
202 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) ( "[l]f the Commission finds that a cable system is subject
to effective competition, the rates for the provision of cable service by such system shall not
be subject to regulation by the Commission or by a State or franchising authority .... 1").
20121
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
if the video programming services so offered in that area are comparable to
the video programming services provided by the unaffiliated cable operator
in that area.20
In subpart (A), deregulation is permitted when the cable system has a very
low penetration.2" Deregulation in such cases has two sensible justifications.
First, the benefits of regulation in low penetration markets may not be suffi-
cient to offset the administrative costs of rate controls. The logic follows di-
rectly from Figure 1 above. Second, a low penetration may be indicative of
competition from other sources.2" The remaining subparts define effective
competition-that is, competition sufficient to warrant the removal of all rate
regulations-in its most stringent case as the presence of a single competitor
offering service to at least half the market.2 "4 Effective competition, therefore,
is defined by Congress as the presence of, essentially, haifa competitor as the
most stringent test. In subpart (D), there is no market overlap requirement.2 7
Subpart (B) is the most stringent standard, requiring both a 50-percent overlap
and 15-percent penetration by the rival.2"' The threshold Hirschman Herfindahl
Index ("HHI") for effective competition (and deregulation) under this section
is 7,450.20
The Commission's actual implementation of the "effective competition"
standard also indicates that perfect competition is unsuitable. In its review of
basic cable deregulation in Montgomery County, Maryland, the Media Bureau
concluded:
There is no statutory basis to delay basic rate deregulation in a franchise area until the
arrival of perfect competition there and the resolution of all issues between a cable
operator and a franchise authority to the latter's satisfaction. Indeed, Section 623(b)(1)
of the Act, which the County invokes, sets the standard for basic cable rates not at per-
fect competition, but at the level that would be charged if there were effective compe-
203 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(l)(A)-(D).
204 47 U.S.C. § 543(i)(1)(A).
205 See 2011 Report on Cable Industry Prices, supra note 165, 1805 n.31 (suggesting
that low market penetration may have resulted from the presence of a second operator in the
community).
206 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)-(D).
207 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(D). With regard to LEC entry, it is the threat that matters. See
In re Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 5296, 111 (Mar. 25, 1999) ("[T]he Cable Services
Bureau has found that a LEC's presence can have a competitive impact on a cable operator
before the LEC finishes installing its plant or rolling out its service. We see no reason from
the record before us not to continue applying the LEC test in this way when the likelihood
of impending competition throughout a substantial part of the incumbent cable operator's
service area is established, the competitive service is commercially available, and potential
subscribers in the franchise area served by the incumbent are reasonably aware that the ser-
vice is either actually available to them or will be available within a reasonable time.").
208 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(l)(B)(ii).
209 The calculation is 852 + 152. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 18-19 (2010), available at http://commcns.org/SQDgIP.
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tition.21°
Plainly, the Commission rejects the perfect competition standard when ap-
proving deregulation of cable television services.
Notably, we do not necessarily advocate for or reject the formal adoption of
the provisions of Section 623(l)(1) as a test to see whether Section 629(e) is
satisfied. Nevertheless, Section 623 is important in that Congress deliberately
established a standard of effective competition that is far less than the textbook
notion of "perfect competition," and codified the idea that even a little compe-
tition eliminates the need for regulation. Furthermore, as discussed above, in
its Navigation Devices Order, the Commission acknowledged the "effectively
competitive" standard is a suitable benchmark for a "fully competitive" MVPD
marketplace, though perhaps applying the overlap and penetration thresholds
to a larger geographic area than just a franchise market."'
In light of this discussion, we propose to define fully competitive for pur-
poses of Section 629(e) as a "condition where market forces are sufficiently
strong to eliminate the need for government regulation." ' As noted above, this
definition has many advantages. First, it is drawn from the economic literature,
and thus has academic legitimacy." 3 Second, it is consistent with the underly-
ing economic realities of the communications industry, where marginal cost
pricing is infeasible.214 Third, it is a very good match for the problem at hand,
where the sunset provision of Section 629(e) involves setting aside regulation,
and explicitly requires the agency to consider the costs of intervention on both
competition and the public interest. Fourth, the definition requires that there be
some force operating on price sufficient to permit the removal of regulation.2"5
Consistent with the "effective competition" standard in Section 623(1), that
force could be the presence of a competitor serving some portion of the market
and exerting downward pressure on prices or affecting quality or some other
mode of rivalry. Fifth, by including the "need for government regulation" in
the definition, the parameters of "fully competitive" can vary across issues,
providing flexibility to the agency. Since the cost and benefits of regulation
vary across interventions, the threshold level of "market forces" sufficient to
make regulation unnecessary will not be uniform across all regulatory inter-
210 In re Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, on behalf of its subsidiaries and affili-
ates; Petition for Determination of Effective Competition in Two Communities in Maryland,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 13340, 12 (Sept. 21, 2010) (footnotes
omitted).
211 See infra Section III; Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 64.
212 Implicit is that market forces are sufficient to protect consumers and ensure just and
reasonable rates.
213 See KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 189, at 100-01.
214 See Ford & Spiwak, The Impossible Dream, supra note 166, at 9.
215 Regulation may be too costly even in the presence of monopoly.
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ventions." 6 Therefore, a finding of "fully competitive" for Section 629(e) need
not translate to a finding of "fully competitive" in any other instance.
C. Satisfying the Statute
In order to sunset Section 629(a), Section 629(e) requires the Commission to
make, at a minimum, a plausible argument that the market for multichannel
video programming and the market for converter boxes and interactive equip-
ment are "fully competitive." 27 As noted above, for purposes of Section
629(e), we define "filly competitive" as a situation where market forces are
sufficiently strong to eliminate the need for government regulation. We now
discuss each determination in turn.
1. The Market for Multichannel Video Programming is "Fully Competitive"
for Purposes of 629(e)(1)
Given our definition of "fully competitive," the Commission could make
several plausible arguments that the first prong of Section 629(e) is satisfied. In
the Navigation Devices Order, the Commission did not finalize its position on
a geographic market definition for MVPD services. 21 Yet, regardless of
whether we assume for purposes of Section 629(e)(1) that the market for mul-
tichannel video programming is local or national,29 there are at least two com-
petitors in every market-satellite television (DirecTV and Dish) is essentially
ubiquitous and is a very real and significant competitor in the market.22 The
most recent Video Competition Report, which draws conclusions based on
2006 data, observes:
We find that almost all consumers are able to obtain programming through over-the-
air broadcast television, a cable service, and at least two DBS providers. In some ar-
eas, consumers also may have access to video programming delivered by emerging
technologies, such as digital broadcast spectrum, fiber-to-the-home facilities, or web-
based Internet video.2
Similarly, in the National Broadband Plan, the agency observed, "four out
216 In Figure 1, different conclusions can be drawn by altering the size of R.
217 See 47 U.S.C. § 549(a), (e).
218 CommercialAvailability I, supra note 13, I 11.
219 Id. ("[T]he relevant geographic market for assessing MVPD competition is local and
its extent can be defined by the overlap of the 'footprints' of the various service provid-
ers.").
220 See In re Time Warner Cable Inc.; Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse
Partnership; Petition for Determination of Effective Competition in Four Massachusetts
Communities, 23 F.C.C.R. 6441, 5 (Apr. 14, 2008).
221 See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the De-
livery of Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 4 (Nov. 27,
2007) [hereinafter Thirteenth Annual Report].
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of the top 10 MVPDs are not cable companies and represent 41% of MVPD
subscribers. 222 Indeed, current conditions stand in stark contrast to when the
FCC first issued its Navigation Devices Order back in 1998 where DBS was
"still a relatively new entrant in the MVPD market. ,.2" As such, customers
have multiple choices of providers, and the number of choices is rising with
the actual entry of telephone companies in many markets and over-the-top vid-
eo services wherever broadband is available.
24
While non-committal in defining local geographic markets in the Navigation
Devices Order, the Commission suggested that Nielsen's Areas of Dominant
Influence, or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas could provide assistance
in defining "appropriate geographic market definition[s]. ''25 These geographic
areas are very similar to Nielsen's Designated Market Areas ("DMAs"), for
which we have competitive information.226 Recent evidence indicates that non-
cable video delivery systems (or "alternative delivery systems" or "ADSs")
account for at least 15 percent market share of television households in 203 of
the largest 210 DMAs, satisfying the "effectively competitive" standard of
Section 623(1) for almost every U.S. household.227
A "fully competitive" finding in the MVPD market under Section 629(e)
should not be problematic before a reviewing court. For example, in striking
down the Commission's Cable Ownership Cap Rule, the D.C. Circuit found,
among other things, that DBS companies alone now serve approximately 33
percent of all subscribers (satisfying Section 623(l)(1)(B) if viewed at the na-
tional level), 228 and DirecTV and Dish Network each serve more customers
than any cable company with the exception of Comcast.229 Indeed, the court
found that:
[Tihe record is replete with evidence of ever increasing competition among video
providers: Satellite and fiber optic video providers have entered the market and grown
in market share since the Congress passed the 1992 Act, and particularly in recent
years. Cable operators, therefore, no longer have the bottleneck power over pro-
222 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 51.
223 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 112.
224 Cf. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 51, 67 n. 116 (noting entry of Veri-
zon Communications and AT&T to the MVPD market).
225 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, It11.
226 Geographic Definitions, MARKETING SYSTEMS GROUP, http://commcns.org/Xhsgd4
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (defining DMAs as "a geographic area that represents individual
television markets as defined by Nielsen Media Research. DMA's are typically defined by
county and the market definitions are updated each fall by [Nielsen].").
227 ADS, OTA, and Wired-Cable Penetration by DMA, TELEVISION ADVERTISING Bu-
REAU, http://commcns.org/Xhsn8o (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). These markets include al-
most all United States households. Local Television Market Universe Estimates, NIELSEN
COMPANY (Jan. 1, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/XdKOKB.
228 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
229 Id. at 1, 8.
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gramming that concerned the Congress in 1992.230
Since this sentiment was expressed before over-the-top video had become a
serious contender in video distribution, it is not unreasonable to expect a will-
ingness by the court to accept a finding of a fully competitive MVPD market.
Finally, given that Congress price deregulated cable programming above
"basic tier" services in the 1996 Act,23" ' we can also infer that Congress deemed
the market for higher tier cable services to be "fully competitive" for purposes
of Section 629(e). As observed at the time by Rep. Edward Markey,
The pending legislation will deregulate the rates of most cable systems 3 years from
now-in March 1999. The rationale for deregulating cable systems at that point is due
largely to the success of the Cable Act of 1992 .... [The 1992 Act] gave emerging
satellite competitors and others access to cable programming, making competition vi-
able. I am encouraged by the progress that direct broadcast satellite companies and
wireless cable companies are making in signing up customers and competing against
incumbent cable operators.232
Thus, Congress, in the 1996 Act, determined that the multichannel video
market was "fully competitive" in the sense that market forces were suffi-
ciently strong to eliminate the need for government regulation for cable pro-
gramming services.233 Representative Markey's statement includes words like
"emerging" and "progress," suggesting that the deregulation was based on the
belief that competitive alternatives would succeed going forward; if this was
Congress' belief, it has come to fruition. From 1995 to 2006, for example, di-
rect broadband satellite services grew from 1.7 million to 28 million subscrib-
ers, the latter representing about 29 percent of all U.S. MVPD subscribers.3
More recent evidence indicates that DBS players control a thirty-three percent
market share and "four out of the top 10 MVPDs are not cable companies and
represent 41 percent of MVPD subscribers. 235
230 Id.
231 47 U.S.C. § 543(b).
232 142 CONG. REc. 1169 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ed. Markey supporting the confer-
ence report to S. 652).
233 Of course, Congress did leave the basic programming tier regulated subject to a sub-
sequent determination that a particular franchise was subject to "effective competition."
Notably, the FCC has granted petitions of effective competition in over 7,000 cable systems,
including many large cable systems. See 2011 Report on Cable Industry Prices, 14. Fran-
chising authorities have chosen not to regulate basic tier rates in numerous other systems,
providing further evidence of the competitive nature of the MVPD market across the coun-
try. In re Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992; Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Pro-
gramming Services, and Equipment, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 12 F.C.C.R. 22,756,
13 &n.8.
234 Compare In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Second Annual Report, I I F.C.C.R. 2060, 49 (Dec. 7,
1995) (1.7 million DBS subscribers), with Thirteenth Annual Report, supra note 221, 75
(27.97 million DBS subscribers).
235 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009); NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN,
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Based on this evidence and a sensible and well-documented definition of the
term "fully competitive," we believe that the Commission can make a positive
determination that the market for multichannel video programming is "fully
competitive" for purposes of Section 629(e). In so doing, the first-prong of the
sunset provisions of Section 629(e) is satisfied.
2. The Market for Converter Boxes and Interactive Equipment is "Fully
Competitive "for Purposes of 629(e) (2)
Again, under our standard, the market for converter boxes and interactive
communications equipment used in conjunction with that service is fully com-
petitive for purposes of Section 629(e) if there are market forces sufficiently
strong to eliminate the need for government regulation. As with the first prong
of Section 629(e), a finding by the FCC that the equipment market is "fully
competitive" presents no difficulty. Recall that the 1998 Navigation Devices
Order defined the equipment market to include any navigation devices subject
to Section 629.236 Marketplace evidence reveals that there are a large number of
sellers of converter equipment in such a market. Suppliers of set-top box
equipment include, but are not limited to, Pace, Motorola, Cisco, Evolution
Broadband, Samsung, Zoom, Panasonic, ARRIS, and Tivo.2" Further, there
has never been, nor is there any proposal for, regulation of the equipment man-
ufacturing industry. While it is true that Motorola and Cisco held a sizeable
share of the set-top box market, emerging competition is substantially impact-
ing sales by these firms.238 But, even if the two companies split the entire mar-
ket, their rivalry would satisfy the 50-15 standard of 623(t)(1)."' Evidence of
hit-and-run entry in the past suggests that the market share success of these
companies may be largely due to superior efficiency and technology rather
than any anticompetitive actions.24°
supra note 3, at 51.
236 Commercial Availability I, supra note 13, 111.
237 Comments of Nat' Cable and Telecomm. Ass'n, supra note 123, at 9 ("Cable opera-
tors now purchase set-top boxes from a growing number of consumer electronics manufac-
turers, including Pace, Motorola, Cisco, Evolution Broadband, Samsung, Panasonic, AR-
RIS, and TiVo.").
238 Todd Spangler, Cisco's Cable Sales Get Hammered Set-Top Sales in North America
Drop 40% Year-Over- Year, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://commcns.org/13lw7VU; John Pletz, Motorola Mobility's Cable Set-Top Box Unit
Losing Ground, CRAIN'S CHI. BUSINESS (June 6, 2011), http://commcns.org/YbNejz; Jeff
Baumgartner, Samsung Boxes Break In at Cablevision, LIGHT READING CABLE (Aug. 19,
2010), http://commcns.org/Vruclz.
239 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B).
240 Baumgartner, supra note 238. Hit-and-run entry requires low sunk entry costs, which
permits firms to enter a market in pursuit of profits, and exit if profits turn out to be unavail-
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Recent evidence indicates that industry concentration in the navigation de-
vices market is falling rapidly.241 A market survey by Infonetics Research, re-
leased in March 2011, provides market share data for the navigation devices
market for the years 2008, 2009 and 20 10.242 This data is summarized in Table
1. Using the market share data from this report to compute an HHI for the in-
dustry in 2008 indicates something much like duopoly, where the HHI would
be 5,000 if the firms were equal sized. In 2010, alternately, the HHI had fallen
significantly, to the equivalent of just over five firms. Under the 2010 Merger
Guidelines, the HHI is just above the threshold (1,500) for an "unconcentrated
market."243 A continued decline in industry concentration is expected, as cable
operators-and consumers-further diversify their equipment supplier base.
For example, TiVo entered into agreements to provide joint services with
Comcast and DirecTV, and (other things constant) its market share is expected
to rise as a result (subsequent to full implementation). 2" In any case, the set-top
market in the recent past, much less in the now distant past when the 1996 Act
was written, is not the same market as today. The potential benefits from Sec-
tion 629 are, consequently, much smaller, though there is little reason to sus-
pect the costs of mandated technology standards have fallen.
able. The history of hit-and-run entry in the set-top market, by firms like Sony, could be
used to suggest the converter box market is contestable, implying competitive outcomes
even when only one or a few firms participate in the market. See William J. Baumol, Con-
testable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1,4
(1982).
241 Note, however, that concentration does not directly map to competitiveness.
242 Cable, Satellite, IPTV, and OTT Set-Top Boxes and Subscribers, Quarterly World-
wide and Regional Market Share, Size and Forecasts, 4Q10, INFONETIcs RESEARCH (Mar.
16, 2011), http://commcns.org/WKSZy2 (on file with CommLaw Conspectus).
243 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 209, at 18-19.
244 Full integration of the services remained "in process" as of the publication of this
paper. See, e.g., Eric A. Taub, Tivo and DirecTV Together Again, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2012), http://commcns.org/XGY21R; Benny Evangelista, TiVo-Comcast service mix finally
happens - 7 years later, SFGATE (Apr. 10, 6:30 PM), http://commcns.org/XGY7FY. See
also TiVo and Comcast Team Up to Offer the First Retail Cable Set-Top With DVR That
Delivers Linear TV, Broadband Content and Xfinity On Demand Library All From One Box
Comcast to Help TiVo to Promote Solution with Retail and Marketing Support, PR-INSIDE
(May 09, 2011, 2:38 PM), http://commcns.org/102cgx6; Press Release, DirecTV, DI-
RECTV and TiVo to Launch New HD DIRECTV DVR with TiVo Service (Sept. 3, 2008),
available at http://commcns.org/Vrv9dM; Don Reisenger, DirecTV TiVo DVR Delayed to
2011, CNET NEws (Oct. 4, 2010 12:37 PM), http://commcns.org/VaOQuQ.
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Table 2. Concentration in the Navigation Devices Market
2008 2009 2010
Revenue-based HHI 5,667 2,020 1,913
Unit-based HHI 5,475 2,417 1,849
Source: Infonetics Research (2011).
Also, some cable operators are finding ways to deliver video without using a
set-top box, utilizing software-based security and delivering content from the
"cloud" to a variety of devices.245 Cablevision, for example, claims to have
hundreds of thousands of customers using its network DVR service, which
eliminates an operator-supplied DVR by moving the recording capability into
the cloud.2 46 Similarly, Comcast's Xfinity app for iPad allows users to both
change channels and to stream TV shows and movies from Comcast's On-
Demand catalog directly to their iPad.247 The growing number of over-the-top
Internet-video equipment, such as Roku, Boxee, Western Digital, Logitech,
GoogleTV, and Apple TV, among others, may soon be a competitor of, rather
than a complement to, traditional video services that require a set-top box.248
For example, one over-the-top video vendor states that thirty percent of its cus-
tomers cancel cable service after using its service.249 So, while many MVPDs
are using over-the-top video as a complement to their services and Internet-
based video is not ideal for all types of content, over-the-top services may
245 See, e.g., Ryan Lawler, Why Time Warner Cable Is Cutting Its Own Cord, GIGAOM
(Jan. 7, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://commcns.org/102cLqY; Steve Donohue, The Disappearing
Set-Top, LIGHT READING CABLE (Apr. 26, 2011), http://commcns.org/W9a2dG.
246 Is the Set-Top Box on its Way Out? Cable Executives Sound Off, FIERCECABLE (Nov.
23, 2010), http://commcns.org/WiS2yh; Graeme McMillan, Cablevision Launches iPad App
Offering 300 Channels of Live T, TIME (Apr. 4, 2011), http://commcns.org/UxfxEm.
247 Alan Henry, Comcast Updates Xfinity App for iPhone, Adds On-Demand Streaming,
APPSCOUT (May 25, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://commcns.org/131xzrg; see also Kevin C. Tofel,
Qualcomm's Wi-Fi Chip Could Turn Handhelds into a TV Set-Top Box, GIGAOM (June 1,
2011, 11:15 AM), http://commcns.org/VrvT2t.
248 See Steve Smith, Over-the-Top! 488 Million Households to be OTT-Capable by
2016, VIDBLOG (June 3, 2011, 1:03 PM), http://commcns.org/l OhsSWD; James K. Wilcox,
Samsung: Cable Without Set-Top Boxes Coming Via TV Apps?, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG
(Jan. 11, 2011, 10:33 AM), http://commcns.org/W9abhd; Ben Drawbaugh, Could This be
the Year We Get to Ditch the Cable Box?, ENGADGET (Jan. 9, 2011, 4:28 PM),
http://commcns.org/U4a4Gi; Tirsina Radu, Millions Ditch Cable for Netflix and Antennas,
TG DAILY (Apr. 11, 2011, 8:47 AM), http://commcns.org/ IICaWpP.
249 Ryan Lawler, 30% of PlayOn Users Cut the Cord, GIGAOM (Oct. 15, 2010, 9:00
AM), http://commcns.org/Il CaXKm; Jon Orlin, Comcast Reports Drop in Cable Subscrib-




serve as a potential competitor to traditional video services for some custom-
ers. Since the traditional set-top box is a strong complement to cable service
(i.e., the box has no independent value), to the extent that over-the-top video
services add to the competition in the MVPD market, they likewise add to the
competition in the set-top box market.25
In our interpretation of Section 629(e)(2), we do not require consumers to be
direct participants in the equipment market, and for obvious reasons. While
Section 629(a) does refer to "commercially availab[ility] . . . to consumers,"
Section 629(e)(2) makes no reference "to consumers," but addresses only
competition generally.251 Such differences in statutory language cannot be ig-
nored. There is no linkage of "fully competitive" to the particular requirements
in Section 629(a), and there is no mention of consumers in 629(e)(2).252 Indeed,
Congress expressed concern in Section 629(e)(3) that the provisions of Section
629(a) may impede competition,253 implying that the full implementation of
629(a) may be in conflict with the requirements of 629(e)(1) and (2).
Further, had Congress intended the "to consumers" element to apply in the
sunset provision, it could have drafted the Act so that sunset was possible only
after the full implementation of Section 629(a) as it did elsewhere in the Act.254
Consider, for example, the language in Section 401 of the Act governing regu-
latory forbearance.255 Congress specifically limited the FCC's ability to forbear
from certain parts of Section 251 and Section 271 of the 1996 Act, mandating
that forbearance was not permitted until those requirements had been "fully
implemented." '256 Section 629(e), however, contains no mandate for full im-
plementation.257 In fact, it would not be possible to do so given Section
629(e)(3), which implies that full implementation may impede competition. If
the MVPD market is competitive and the equipment market is competitive,
then regulation is probably more harmful than helpful, even if consumers are
unable to purchase set-top equipment directly from manufacturers. The statute
reflects that intuition.
250 For further discussion on the economics of complementarity of service and equip-
ment, see George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Consumers and
Wireless Carterfone: An Economic Perspective, PHOENIX CENT. POL'Y BULL No. 21, Sept.
2008, at 5-9, available at http://commcns.org/U4afkL.
251 47 U.S.C. § 549(a), (e)(2).
252 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
253 Id.
254 47 U.S.C. § 160.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 549(e) with 47 U.S.C. § 160.
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3. Sunsetting 629 Would Both Promote Competition and the Public Interest
The third leg of the sunset provisions requires that reduced regulation of the
video marketplace "promote competition" and be in the "public interest.""25 In
our view, satisfying these standards is not a problem. For example, innovation
in the set-top box, if important to consumers, is one means by which firms can
compete. Commoditizing the technology, or hindering the freedom to innovate,
may alter the nature-and impede the intensity-of competition. The point was
not lost on Congress. Section 629(c) permits the agency to waive the regula-
tory requirements of Section 629(a):
[U]pon an appropriate showing by a provider of multichannel video programming and
other services offered over multichannel video programming systems, or an equip-
ment provider, that such waiver is necessary to assist the development or introduction
of a new or improved multichannel video programming or other service offered over
multichannel video programming systems, technology, or products.
25 9
Thus, Congress recognized that under certain conditions, setting aside the
rules may be "necessary to assist the development or introduction of a new or
improved [services and technologies].""26 Eliminating regulation that deters
innovation clearly serves the public interest.26" '
Also, different delivery technologies may face different compliance costs
with the regulation. If so, then relative prices may change, altering the com-
petitive dynamic of the MVPD market. Moreover, Section 629(a) imposes a
price regulation on all MVPDs (i.e., not just cable companies) with regard to
the set-top box (i.e., no subsidies),262 and the impact of this price regulation
may differ across firms and technology types, altering the competitive dy-
namic.
But there is more: As noted above, even the Commission has conceded that
its implementation of 629 has been a costly disaster, forcing operators and con-
sumers to shoulder more than one billion dollars in costs without any discerni-
ble benefits. 63 The agency also acknowledged that its rules would lead to in-
creases in the prices for equipment, burdening consumers with the agency's
258 47 U.S.C. § 549(e).
259 47 U.S.C. § 549.
260 Id. § 549(c).
261 See In re Evolution Broadband, LLC's Request For Waiver of Section 76.1204(a)(1)
of the Commission's Rules; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996; Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 24 F.C.C.R. 7890 (May 28, 2009); January Waiver Requests, supra note 35, at 220;
June 2007 Waiver Requests, supra note 35, at 11780; Guam Cablevision Memorandum,
supra note 35, at 11747.
262 47 U.S.C. § 549(a).
263 George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Outliving Its Usefulness: A Law and Econom-
ics Argument for Sunset of Section 629, PHOENIX CENT. POL'Y BULL. No. 29, June 2011, at
26, available at http://commcns.org/VMFNN6.
2012]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
experimentation." Furthermore, in FCC rule waivers, the agency has explicitly
observed that relief render "substantial public interest benefits by significantly
reducing costs .. ,,26' By extending the regulatory mandate to DBS providers,
the cost of regulatory compliance rises.
If the FCC proceeds quickly to sunset Section 629, the public will also bene-
fit sizably from the avoidance of stranded research, deployment, marketing,
and other costs incurred to bring AllVid to fruition." Similarly, as few cus-
tomers have adopted CableCard and manufacturers have largely ceased invest-
ing in the technology,267 a sunset of Section 629 today minimizes stranded costs
and affects few, if any, consumers. Alternately, if the agency makes another go
at Section 629, it forces MVPDs to incur significant costs and also encourages
manufacturers and customers to make financial commitments to the Commis-
sion's chosen standards. All of these commitments are technology-specific,
and wasted if the agency's scheme falters, which it is bound to do given the
economics of the issue and the dynamic nature of the video industry at pre-
sent.268 Yet, if manufacturers and consumers expect failure, then, based on the
historical evidence, both may proceed cautiously with their commitments to
CableCARD and AllVid. If so, then the expected benefits of the regulatory
scheme will be reduced, but the implementation costs by the MVPD industry
will not, since MVPDs must incur such costs for their own equipment and on
behalf of their customers. 69 Such hedging makes for an unfavorable cost-
benefit analysis for Section 629.
Last, and certainly not least, putting an end to the Section 629 debacle is en-
tirely consistent with the stated purpose of the 1996 Act, "to reduce regula-
tion,"27 and President Obama's recent Executive Order that called upon federal
agencies to conduct a cost-benefit review of existing federal regulations27, in
order to eliminate those that are "excessive, inconsistent, and redundant. 272
264 See AllVid NOI, supra note 2, at 4275, 4301 (statement of Comm'r Baker); see also
Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, 14 ("[W]e recognize that mandating this ap-
proach could be costly for some cable operators."); NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra
note 3, at 50-51.
265 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 9.
266 Ford & Spiwak, Outliving Its Usefulness, supra note 263, at 26.
267 Id. at 26-27.
268 NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 3, at 50-52.
269 Ford & Spiwak, Outliving Its Usefulness, supra note 263, at 27.
270 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl., 10 Stat 56, 56 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 609).
271 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 18, 2011) (applying Order to
"agencies" as defined in Exec. Order No. 12,866); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 1925
(Sept. 30, 1993) (defining "agency" as those defined under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1)). But see 44
U.S.C. § 3502(5) (including the FCC as within the definition of an "independent rcgulatory
agency," thus outside the scope of Exec. Order 13,563).
272 Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18,
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While the FCC, as an "independent" agency, is exempt from complying with
this directive, Chairman Julius Genachowski has wholeheartedly endorsed both
the letter and the spirit of the President's directive.273 Surely, if ever there was a
candidate to show that the Commission was truly committed to removing out-
moded regulations, then ending the Commission's tortured fourteen-year ex-
periment with Section 629 is a prime contender.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Where one stands depends on where one sits. We argue in this paper that the
FCC needs to alter its perception on the proper implementation of Section 629
with this reorientation based on the economics of the multichannel video mar-
ket and the role of the set-top box. Specifically, we argue that the common
view that the set-top box is a tool by which multichannel video providers can
extract surplus from consumers is invalid. Multichannel video providers, in-
cluding cable companies, have no anticompetitive motivation with regard to
the set-top box. In fact, multichannel video providers prefer the efficient out-
come, and the interest of the MVPD and the consumer is common-cheaper,
more innovative set-top boxes increase consumer valuations of multichannel
video services and, in turn, increase profits. If a commercial market for such
equipment is relatively more efficient than self-supply, then the multichannel
video provider will embrace it, thus, increasing its profit while also increasing
consumer welfare. Alternately, if self-supply is more efficient, then the mul-
tichannel video provider prefers self-supply-also to the benefit of consumers.
The multichannel video provider has strong incentives to reduce the price and
cost of converter equipment as well as to pursue value-enhancing innovation.
Therefore, if we observe self-supply of set-top equipment, then the presump-
tion should be that self-supply is relatively more efficient than a commercial
market. It follows, then, that a regulation-forced commercial market for such
devices is likely to produce higher prices and lower economic and consumer
welfare.
We acknowledge that the Commission may sense some legal obligation to
address the mandates of Section 629. That said, the agency retains the flexibil-
ity to either minimize or maximize its intrusion into the video marketplace. We
argue that the FCC should consider, at least for a moment, that the dominance
of self-supply in the set-top box market is a consequence of its relative effi-
2011), http://commcns.org/SQH8TY; see also Elizabeth Williamson, Obama Launches Rule
Review, Pledging to Spur Jobs, Growth, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://commcns.org/I 1CbjRo.
273 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, Address at the Broadband
Acceleration Conference, at 4 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/SQHoST.
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ciency. Economic logic provides some support for this view, thereby encourag-
ing a more temperate implementation strategy, which means something unlike
the heavy-handed AllVid approach. The additional fact that the video market is
evolving at a rapid pace further supports a sober approach to Section 629.274
Regulations designed and implemented today will be archaic in the very near
term.
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Like it or not, until the underlying economic reality changes, the FCC's an-
ticipated aggressive approach to Section 629 is likely-as FCC Commissioner
Robert McDowell notes-to keep the agency in "the Valley of Unattained
Goals. 2 76 For this reason, we have presented in this paper plausible legal, eco-
nomic, and evidentiary arguments on how the Commission can justify the sun-
set of Section 629, thereby purging from the policy debate the view that bil-
lions should be wasted on a futile task simply "because Congress told us to.
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While we understand that the Commission has extended significant political
capital in raising the AllVid issue both in the National Broadband Plan and in
a subsequent Notice of Inquiry, initiating a formal Notice of Proposed Rule-
making will set the agency on a course that, once started, will be difficult to
reverse and could result in another CableCARD-like failure. Present market
conditions in the multichannel video market, while not perfectly competitive in
the textbook sense, are such that regulatory efforts are unlikely to create more
benefits than costs. As a result, Section 629 has "outlived its usefulness" and
should be put to bed.
274 AllVid NOI, supra note 2, 13 (stating that "delivery platforms continue to evolve at
a rapid pace").
275 See, e.g., Commercial Availability Fourth NPRM, supra note 141, at 4328 (statement
of Comm'r McDowell, stating that "technological innovation continues to outpace the gov-
ernment's ability to keep up").
276 Commercial Availability III, supra note 3, at 14,711 (statement of Comm'r McDow-
ell).
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